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This thesis consists of three separate, but related, essays that deal with the topic of how 
supply chain structure as well as the use of contracts impact performance of a supply 
chain. The main focus is the analysis of behavior of indirect-sale supply chains in terms 
of relative bargaining power and decision rights of the participants. Modeling as 
Stackelberg games, this thesis explores the existence of Nash equilibriums and the issues 
surrounding supply chain coordination. 
 
In Essay one, “The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with 
Stochastic Demand”, the analysis focuses on how different supply chain structures affect 
the choice of contracts in coordination under a generalized setting in which more 
powerful agent does not necessarily assume the Stackelberg leadership. This study shows 
that an optimal coordinating contract is based not only upon the overstock liquidation 
advantage the supplier/retailer may have, but also upon the specific decision hierarchy in 
the supply chain. 
 
In Essay two, “Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers”, studies the 
effects of product substitution when suppliers and retailers have an imbalance of decision 
making power. In particular, we address the questions of structure dominance and why 




Finally, Essay three, “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contract when 
Retailer Sells Store-Brand Products”, a retailer-dominated supply chain coordination 
problem is investigated when the retailer sells store-brand products. Among many 
insights developed, it follows that two-parameter revenue-sharing contracts are preferred 
to both wholesale-price contacts and one-parameter revenue-sharing contracts in supply 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Preliminaries 
This thesis studies the relationship between the structure of a supply chain and its 
operational performance. The focus of the thesis is on how structure impacts performance, 
as well as the use of contracts for enhanced performance of the supply chain. The term 
“structure” is employed to identify how products flow through the supply chain, how 
operational decision variables are distributed across the supply chain participants, and 
each participant’s influence in decision-making for the supply chain, i.e., relative 
bargaining power of participants. 
 In any decentralized supply chain consisting of independent firms, if individual 
decisions turn out to be optimal for the supply chain as a whole, then the supply chain is 
referred to as being coordinated. In other words, this supply chain achieves the same 
performance (or efficiency) as an integrated supply chain system in which one firm 
commits all decisions. However, individual firms may engender inefficient operational 
behaviors that serve their own best interests; that is, choosing a lower stocking quantity 
and a higher retail price, contrary to those of an integrated system, to maximize one’s 
own profits. This leads to the entire supply chain profit becoming inferior to that of the 
corresponding integrated system. This phenomenon is usually termed “double 
marginalization” (Spengler 1950), a well-known cause of supply chain inefficiency.  
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 The optimal supply chain performance can be achieved if individual participants 
agree to contract on a set of executions such that each participant’s objective becomes 
aligned with the supply chain’s objective, hence resulting in a coordinated supply chain. 
Much research has been devoted to identifying and evaluating such contracts to 
coordinate supply chains, or at least to improve supply chain efficiency. This dissertation 
research draws on, and contributes to, the same growing stream of literature by 
emphasizing the impact of supply chain structure on supply chain performance. 
 A supply chain structure is herein characterized via a three-faceted approach: 
product flow, decision rights, and bargaining power. As for product flow, if a supplier 
sells products through an intermediary agent such as a retailer, we refer to it as a 
traditional indirect-sale structure. Otherwise, if suppliers sell products directly to end 
customers, it’s called a direct-sale structure (Chiang et al. 2003). For example, suppliers 
may open retail outlets or sell through the internet. A dual structure consisting of both 
indirect and direct sale practices is also surging in practice due to the rapid deployment of 
information technologies. Yet another product flow structure is “drop-shipping”, where a 
retailer acquires end customers through either local stores or the internet, but the supplier 
sends products directly to end customers (Netessine and Rudi 2004). In both direct-sale 
and drop-shipping, products transfer directly from suppliers to end customers, but the key 
difference is that the supplier controls the marketing function in a direct-sale structure, 
whereas in drop-shipping, the retailer engages in the marketing activities.  
 Considering the decision rights facet, a supply chain structure can be identified by 
how decision rights are distributed among supply chain participants. Assume a single-
supplier-single-retailer supply chain in which a wholesale price is quoted (Cachon 2004). 
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Two operational decisions must be made in this supply chain: the wholesale price and 
stocking level, given that the retail price is fixed. If both the wholesale price and stocking 
level decisions are committed by one firm, it is then an integrated supply chain structure. 
On the other hand, if the supplier issues the wholesale price and the retailer determines 
the stocking level, it is termed a retailer-managed inventory (RMI) structure; when the 
supplier determines the stocking level and the retailer chooses the wholesale price, a 
vendor-managed inventory (VMI) structure arises.  
 The third distinguishing feature of a supply chain is the relative bargaining power 
of each participant. Bargaining power determines how supply chain decisions are 
initiated and how the supply chain profit is distributed among participants. Assuming a 
single-supplier-single-retailer supply chain, three alternatives can be identified in this 
context: the supplier has more bargaining power than the retailer; the retailer has more 
bargaining power than the supplier; or both firms have equal decision making power.  
 Using the above three-faceted approach, one may characterize the structure of a 
given supply chain. However, the focus of this dissertation is limited to indirect-sale 
supply chains (thus product flow facet is fixed), and therefore, the supply chain is 
analyzed with respect to relative bargaining power and decision rights of the participants. 
Consequently, the term supply chain “decision structure” refers to the pair: bargaining 
power and decision rights. In the sequel, the term supply chain “power structure” is also 
used synonymously with bargaining power.  
 In modeling supply chain structure, the existing literature conventionally assumes 
that a more powerful firm commits decisions first and a less powerful firm issues 
decisions second. Within the context of Stackelberg game theory (Stackelberg 1934), an 
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earlier mover (i.e., the first decision maker) is termed the Stackelberg leader, and the 
second decision maker is termed the Stackelberg follower. On the other hand, in a supply 
chain where multiple suppliers provide substitutable products to a common retailer, all 
suppliers are commonly assumed (Choi 1991) to have equal power such that they move 
simultaneously in decision-making. These standard assumptions, of course, capture 
certain practices in the real world. However, we can also observe operational behaviors 
that violate these assumptions. For example, Wal-Mart seeks orders from suppliers in 
China and Mexico. While Wal-Mart is more powerful than those suppliers, it does not 
necessarily move first to specify the order quantities. In another instance, a personal-
computer manufacturer (e.g. Hewlett Packard) may use central processing units (CPUs) 
ordered from different suppliers, but the chip supplier Intel usually dominates in that tier 
(New York Times, 2006). Hence, Intel and other niche suppliers cannot be treated as 
having equal bargaining power.  
 In this thesis, these structure-related simplifying assumptions are relaxed. As a 
result, more general settings can be explored such as the case when a more powerful firm 
is not making the first decisions, or when suppliers are not sharing the same decision-
making power. We believe such settings are important because they not only capture 
practices that have not been addressed in previous research, but also they can impact 
supply chain coordination and profit division. Such an exploration can provide useful 




1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
This dissertation consists of three separate, but related, analytical essays that are titled: 
1. “The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with Stochastic 
Demand”, 
2. “Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers”, and  
3. “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contract when Retailer sells 
Store-Brand Products”.  
The research contributions in each chapter are summarized below. 
 Chapter 2, “The Role of Decision Structure in Supply Chain Coordination with 
Stochastic Demand”, studies a single period supply chain with one supplier/manufacturer 
and one retailer. In contrast to the previous literature where one powerful agent assumes 
both the roles of Stackelberg leader and supply chain captain, we analyze situations in 
which these two roles in the supply chain are not necessarily aligned with the same agent. 
We term an agent as a supply chain captain if this agent has more bargaining power than 
the other agents such that this agent can choose a contract to organize the supply chain in 
an attempt to capture more profit from the supply chain. However, the stocking decision 
and pricing decision(s) can be made by either agent. We investigate three forms of 
contracts for possible supply chain coordination: wholesale-price contract (Lariviere and 
Porteus 2001), buyback contract (Pasternack 1985), and markdown-money contract (Tsay 
2001). A wholesale-price contract indicates that the only term of trade between the 
supplier and the retailer is the wholesale price, which the retailer uses to order from the 
supplier. In a buyback contract, the supplier commits to buy back the unsold products 
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from the retailer subject to certain rules. A markdown-money contract allows the retailer 
to salvage the unsold products, but the supplier will still issue a full or partial refund to 
the retailer for those unsold merchandise. 
 This study shows an optimal coordinating contract is based not only upon the 
overstock liquidation advantage the supplier/retailer may have, but also upon the existing 
decision structure of the supply chain. For instance, when the supplier acts as the 
Stackelberg leader, while the retailer owns the liquidation advantage and plays the role of 
supply chain captain and determines the stocking level, a wholesale-price contract will 
easily coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, this analysis illustrates that the 
Stackelberg leadership is, however, not always necessary for the supply chain captain to 
achieve coordination. Moreover, sacrificing the leadership in certain cases allows the 
captain to achieve more profit. This study verifies the popularity of the wholesale-price 
contract in practice because it can achieve coordination for several supply chain 
structures. 
 Chapter 3, “Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers”, 
studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer. This essay relaxes the 
standard assumption that the two suppliers have “balanced” power in the supply chain – 
the assumption that both suppliers move simultaneously and act as either Stackelberg 
leaders or Stackelberg followers over the retailer, or the assumption that the two suppliers 
and the retailer all move simultaneously in decision making. This research focuses on 
situations when the suppliers have an imbalance in their relative power structure such that 
one supplier can be the Stackelberg leader over the other supplier. This consideration 
allows investigating a total of eight possible power structures, of which, five have not 
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been previously studied. Such structures are modeled as either two-stage or three-stage 
Bertrand Stackelberg hierarchies, or a single-stage non-cooperative game, and important 
issues such as supply chain performance and stability, and the effects of product 
substitution (or product competition) are investigated.  
 
In Chapter 3, the following important conclusions are made:  
(1) With increasing product substitution, a multi-supplier-one-retailer supply chain can 
achieve coordination asymptotically under a simple wholesale pricing mechanism. 
(2) Each supplier’s profit consistently decreases when products become more 
substitutable even if the suppliers dominate the retailer, whereas the retailer benefits 
from a high degree of substitution regardless of the supply chain power structure. 
(3) A “niche” supplier is not necessarily an underdog in the presence of a larger supplier 
when seeking to increase the share of its supply chain profit under certain decision 
power structures. 
(4) In the case of multiple suppliers, “profit percentages” can characterize their relative 
power differences more accurately than the respective “absolute profits”.  
(5) Certain power-imbalanced channels are shown to dominate others. Moreover, we 
show that Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg channels are no longer 
stable structures (as considered in Choi, 1991) when suppliers are able to behave as if 
they are power imbalanced.  
This study can be used to address a number of business strategies in practice. For 
example, large retailers carry store-brand, along with national-brand substitutable 
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products in order to avoid suppliers’ price collusion and to spur price competition. On the 
other hand, large suppliers such as those in apparel industries sell through retailers, as 
well as opening retail outlets to provide the same products because apparel is a highly 
substitutable product type.  
 In Chapter 4, “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contract when 
Retailer Sells Store-Brand Products”, a retailer-dominated supply chain coordination 
problem is analyzed when the retailer sells store-brand products. The existing literature 
regarding store brands focuses on identifying and evaluating factors that affect the store-
brand success, and the retailers’ incentives to choose store-brand strategies.  In contrast, 
this essay studies the retailing supply chain coordination using revenue-sharing contracts 
when the retailer sells store-brand products. A revenue-sharing contract allows the 
supplier to share part of the revenue that the retailer generates from carrying the 
supplier’s (outside) products. 
In the analysis, the supply chain’s decision hierarchy is modeled as a Stackelberg 
game, and it assumes the retailer gains more bargaining power to move earlier than the 
outside supplier. Two sets of decision rights (two scenarios) are studied: first, the retailer 
determines the outside (product) wholesale price in conjunction with her store-brand 
retail price, and the supplier chooses a retail price for himself; second, the retailer 
determines the outside retail price along with her own retail price, and the supplier 
chooses his own wholesale price. The revenue-sharing rate is determined upon 
negotiation in either case. In each scenario, the outside supplier uses decisions to 
maximize his own possible profit, but the retailer can either optimize the entire supply 
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chain for coordination, i.e., coordinating decisions, or can optimize her own profit 
function, i.e., non-coordinating decisions.  
This essay shows a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract (with both wholesale 
price and revenue-sharing rate) outperforms both the wholesale-price contract and one-
parameter revenue-sharing contract (specified with only a revenue sharing rate) in supply 
chain coordination due to its flexibility in profit division. Retailer’s coordinating 
decisions lower the market share and profitability of the store-brand products. However, 
the two-parameter revenue sharing contract allows the retailer to achieve more profit 
from the entire supply chain.  
It is also demonstrated that when the supplier determines his retail price, and 
when the retailer can specify both the wholesale-price and revenue-sharing rate, the 
retailer’s coordinating decisions lead to Pareto improvement in contrast to her non-
coordinating decisions. However, if the revenue-sharing rate is fixed, the retailer will 
make decisions to optimize her own profits instead. Moreover, when the supplier 
specifies his wholesale price, a non-coordinating wholesale-price contract is the optimal 
choice for the retailer. .  
 
1.3 Scope and Limitations 
This thesis offers theoretical studies on the supply chain structure and its impact on the 
performance and the use of contracts in the supply chain. We provide closed-form results 
in each essay so that insights can be developed for the problem under investigation. The 
suggestions so-made can be utilized for enhancing supply chain performance in practice. 
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This thesis has relaxed several assumptions that are widely used in the literature. 
However, these analyses are contingent on certain limiting assumptions. For instance, 
throughout this thesis, information is assumed symmetric across the supply chain; 
although it is common in practice that asymmetric information exists in a supply chain. 
This aspect is left as a subject for future research and is not within the scope of this 
dissertation.  
 A second assumption upon which the results are based is the type of demand 
functions. In the second and third essays, analyses are conducted based on linear 
deterministic demand functions that account for product substitution effects. Such 
demand functions are widely used in the literature and have contributed immensely to 
generate fruitful insights in numerous cases. Extensions and generalizations to other 








Chapter 2:  




In a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, if both agents seek to 
optimize their own expected profits, a sub-optimal solution will be reached. This 
phenomenon is termed double marginalization (Spengler 1950), a well known cause of 
supply chain inefficiency. That is, the profit of a decentralized supply chain is less than 
that of an integrated supply chain due to a lower stock quantity or a higher retail price if 
the retail price is endogenously determined. For example, Granot and Yin (2005) show 
that with a buyback contract, and with a uniformly distributed demand, uncoordinated 
supply chain efficiency is in the order of only 75%. Use of other forms of demand may 
lead to even worse theoretical efficiency.  
  Due to the effect of double marginalization, it is desirable to design proper 
contract forms for the decentralized supply chain to improve its efficiency. A well 
designed contract can lead to an agent’s individual decision being even optimal as a 
whole for the supply chain. In this case, there will be no double marginalization, that is, 
the supply chain is coordinated. Contracts that provide coordination have been vastly 
studied in the literature. For instance, see return policies (Pasternack 1985, Kandel 1996, 
Tsay 2001), revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2002), quantity discount (Jeuland and 
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Shugan 1983, Weng 1995), quantity flexibility (Tsay 1999), sales rebate (Taylor 2002), 
options contract (Barnes-Schuster et al 2002), price discount or “bill back” contracts 
(Bernstein and Federgruen 2005). Also, see Cachon (2003), Lariviere (1999), and Sahin 
and Robinson (2002) for excellent reviews.  
  In this chapter, the focus is on the problem of supply chain coordination under 
contracts. However, more attention is devoted to the presence of return policies. Return 
policies have been studied quite extensively in the literature; a comprehensive review of 
return policies and their effects under different settings is given below. 
 A return policy is a commitment by the supplier/manufacturer to refund the 
unsold merchandise to the retailer. Return policies can stimulate retailers to increase the 
size of orders because the supplier shares the overstock risk. Meanwhile, return policies 
can benefit suppliers as well. Given that there are substitutable products in the market, the 
unsatisfied demand will be lost if the retailer is under-stocked. Furthermore, when the 
product is new to the market, the retailer has less information about demand than the 
supplier and the retailer may become conservative in ordering. Return policies can 
eliminate any hesitation in setting a correct stocking quantity. Padmanabhan and Png 
(1995) discuss other motivations for return policies, for instance, protecting the brand 
image by preventing the retailer from selling stale products or discounting unsold goods, 
supporting end-user return policy, etc. Return polices are widely used in industries such 
as publishing, pre-recorded music, computer hardware and software, automobile parts, 
and apparel.  
 One general format of return policy implemented in practice is the “buyback 
contract”. Under this contract structure, suppliers commit to buy back the unsold products 
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from retailers subject to certain rules. Review of the literature shows that there exist 
different forms of buyback contracts. With regard to quantity limitations in return, there 
exist partial-return or full-return contracts (Pasternack 1985). With partial return, the 
retailer can return either up to a certain percentage of the ordered quantities, or the 
quantity ordered in excess of a predefined minimum order quantity, referred to as 
“percent rebate policy” and “quantity rebate policy”, respectively, see Webster and Weng 
(2000). On the other hand, in a full return contract, the supplier accepts all unsold goods 
with full or partial refund per unit returned. The latter contracts are well addressed in the 
literature, see Cachon (2003), Emmons and Gilbert (1998), Granot and Yin (2005), 
Kandel (1996), Lariviere (1999), Padmanabhan and Png (1997), Pasternack (1985), and 
Tsay (2001), for instance. 
     Consider a decentralized supply chain with two risk-neutral agents, the supplier 
and the retailer. Assume that information is symmetric across the supply chain. Suppose 
the retailer faces a price insensitive stochastic demand. Then, the supply chain 
participants’ decision problem can be formulated as a newsvendor model. At the 
beginning of a single selling season, the supplier acts first as a Stackelberg leader to issue 
a buyback contract and the retailer follows with a stocking decision. Under this setting, 
Pasternack (1985) shows that a full-return-partial-refund buyback contract can coordinate 
the supply chain. Furthermore, the coordinating contract in this case has the property that 
increasing the buyback price yields a higher wholesale price, which thus benefits the 
supplier rather than the retailer. 
     Using the same setting as Pasternack, Kandel (1996) examines the problem from 
an economic perspective. In particular, Kandel assumes both agents optimize their own 
   13
expected profits and addresses how agents’ bargaining power influences contracting 
decisions. Kandel shows that the supplier prefers a “consignment contract” in which both 
the wholesale price and buyback price equal to the retail price if the supplier has more 
bargaining power. In contrast, when the retailer has more bargaining power, she favors a 
non-return (wholesale price only) contract.  
     Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2004) introduce retail promotional effort into 
Pasternack’s setting, which is independent of the demand distribution. They assume the 
retailer stocks before observing the market demand, but she exerts promotional effort 
after observing the demand. If supply chain agents individually optimize their decisions, 
then the full-return buyback is better for the retailer in contrast to a non-return policy; 
however, any advantage to the supplier is ambiguous. Two buyback variants are 
introduced for coordination and Pareto improvement: effort-sharing buyback and 
buyback with sales rebate. The “quantity rebate policy” (one form of partial return as 
termed in Webster and Weng, 2000) can coordinate the supply chain, but if this results in 
any profit advantages to either agent over the uncoordinated supply chain remain unclear. 
 Dealing mainly with sales rebates, Taylor (2002) shows the “buyback with sales 
rebate” can coordinate the supply chain when exercising the retail promotional effort 
before the exact demand is revealed. One key finding is that buyback alone cannot 
coordinate the supply chain, regardless of whether the demand distribution depends on 
the effort – see, Cachon (2002) for the analysis when the demand distribution is 
dependent on the effort.  
 If the assumption of price independence of demand is relaxed from the Pasternack 
(1985) model, a buyback contract no longer coordinates the supply chain (Lariviere 1999, 
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Bernstein and Federgruen 2005, and Cachon 2003). However, the buyback contract may 
still be better for both agents in contrast to a wholesale-price contract (Emmons and 
Gilbert, 1998). Granot and Yin (2005) demonstrate that this attribute depends on the 
demand properties. When the average demand function is nonlinear, e.g., a negative 
power function, a buyback contract may no longer be superior to a wholesale-price 
contract from the supplier’s perspective.  
  In the preceding models, information symmetry is assumed for supply chain 
agents. In contrast, Ha (2001) investigates a situation when the retailer incurs a marginal 
cost, which is private, for each product it orders. In contrast to the coordinated situation 
that occurs when information is symmetric, coordination is un-reachable, and a higher 
retail price and lower stocking quantity will be observed in this case. Lariviere (2002) 
studies the case where the retailer is capable of gaining more accurate demand 
information through costly forecasting, and compares the performance of a buyback 
contract and a quantity flexibility contract, which is a “percent rebate policy” with a full 
refund. Sahin and Robinson (2002) offer an excellent review on physical flow 
coordination in terms of the degree of information sharing. 
 In all of the preceding work, buyback contracts are studied within the framework 
of risk neutrality. However, Gan, Sethi and Yan (2004) show that buybacks combined 
with a “side payment” can coordinate the supply chain when both agents are risk averse. 
Tsay (2002) adopts Padmanabhan and Png (1997)’s demand model to analyze how risk 
sensitivity affects agents’ decisions and how a return policy alters those dynamics.  In 
such a case, ignoring risk sensitivity can dramatically affect supplier’s profit.  
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 In the previous work, stochastic demand is investigated within a newsvendor 
model to analyze supply chain contracts. However, in Padmanabhan and Png (1997), and 
Butz (1997), uncertain demand is modeled by two linear demand functions within a 
binomial distribution with fixed probabilities. The retailer stocks before knowing which 
demand curve is realized, but the retail price is set after the demand function is observed. 
Padmanabhan and Png show that when demand is uncertain, a buyback contract increases 
the supplier profit by attenuating retail price competition if demand is low or intensifying 
competition if demand is high, given that both agents are self-interested. Unlike 
Padmanabhan and Png (1997), in which the retailer’s stocking quantity is assumed to be 
lower than the high demand and a full-return-full-refund policy is employed, Butz (1997) 
assumes a full-return-partial-refund policy, and the retailer is persuaded to order the same 
quantity as in the case of high demand. In this context, the retailer has the intention to 
lower the retail price to sell more than the system-wide optimized quantity. 
 Marvel and Peck (1995) model the demand uncertainty in two parts: customer 
arrivals uncertainty and uncertainty over consumers’ valuation of the products. The 
uncertainty in customer arrivals induces the supplier to offer a buyback contract, whereas 
valuation uncertainty results in the retailer setting a higher retail price. This model 
partially explains why suppliers can be conservative in offering return mechanisms.  
     Another form of return policy contracts is referred to as “markdown-money” 
(Tsay 2001). Unlike buyback contracts, the supplier gives up the salvage opportunity to 
the retailer but still compensates the retailer with partial credit for each unsold unit. This 
contract format applies to products whose unit production cost is low, and thus, salvage 
value is trivial and the supplier can avoid product-return related costs, e.g. transportation 
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cost and storage cost. Tsay concludes that the specific format of this return policy is 
influenced by the salvage advantage. That is, if the supplier holds the salvage advantage, 
coordination can be reached by a buyback contract; otherwise, a markdown-money 
contract will coordinate the supply chain.  
 All preceding literature is based on one conventional assumption: the agent that 
holds the negotiation power moves as the Stackelberg leader in the decision hierarchy. 
This assumption results from a fact that in a Stackelberg game hierarchy, first-moving 
agent has the advantage to choose the best action set if it can perfectly anticipate the 
second-moving agent’s response. However, the main concern of each agent is to achieve 
as much profit as possible from the supply chain, but it must be noted that the 
Stackelberg leadership position cannot always guarantee more profit. For example, Gal-
Or (1985) and Dowrick (1986) prove that if the profit functions are upwards sloping, the 
Stackelberg follower will achieve more profit when each agent intends to maximize his 
own profit; Lariviere and Porteus (2001) conclude that the Stackelberg follower may 
capture more profit than the Stackelberg leader does using a simple wholesale-price 
contract.  
 In this chapter, we assume that a powerful agent need not necessarily be a 
Stackelberg leader; furthermore, the stocking decision and the pricing decision(s) of a 
contract can be set by either agent. These relaxations allow us to consider ten possible 
structures, some of which have been addressed in the literature; however, we provide a 
more in-depth analysis. For example, Kandel (1996) studies the scenario that the retailer 
holds the negotiation power and the pricing right, and each agent intends to optimize its 
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own profit. We illustrate under this scenario how coordination can be reached using 
contracts.  
We study a newsvendor model and investigate three contracts for coordination: 
wholesale-price contract, buyback contract, and markdown-money contract. Our study 
shows that a supply chain-coordinating contact depends not only upon the salvage 
advantage that the supplier/retailer may have, but also upon the existing decision 
structure. For example, Tsay (2001) identifies that when the retailer has the salvage 
advantage, only a markdown-money contract can coordinate the supply chain. We show 
that it is true when the supplier holds the negotiation power and functions as the 
Stackelberg leader, but in other cases, the markdown-money contract is outperformed by 
a wholesale-price contract with respect to coordination. Meanwhile, a Stackelberg 
leadership position is not always necessary for a powerful agent in achieving 
coordination; moreover, sacrificing the leadership in certain cases allows the agent to 
achieve more profit. For example, a retailer that has the negotiation power can be better-
off acting as a Stackelberg follower in choosing the stocking level, instead of being a 
Stackelberg leader. Managerial insights are also discussed in the sequel. 
     The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains the 
model assumptions, and illustrations of the supply chain decision structure by clarifying 
the difference between the Stackelberg leader/follower positions and the bargaining 
power positions in a supply chain. Section 2.3 provides an integrated supply chain model 
as the benchmark. Section 2.4 investigates three contract formats when the supplier 
serves as both the supply chain captain and the Stackelberg leader. Sections 2.5-2.9 
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discuss which contract(s) should be employed for coordination under various decision 
structures. Conclusions are in Section 2.10.  
 
2.2 Model Assumptions and Supply Chain Decision Structures 
2.2.1 Model Assumptions 
We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer in a single period. 
All decision makers are risk neutral and information is symmetric within the supply 
chain. The supply chain faces a stochastic demand; thus, a newsvendor model can be 
employed to determine the stocking decision before agents observe the demand. 
Furthermore, the retail price is exogenously determined before the selling season and it 
will remain constant throughout the selling season. We further assume that the production 
cost is the only cost faced by the supplier. The retailer does not suffer any cost except 
paying a wholesale price per unit to the supplier. The supplier has no capacity limitation 
in determining the stock size. At the end of the selling season, either the supplier will buy 
back and salvage the unsold products, or the retailer will salvage the unsold items per 
contract terms if such exist. Either party can have the unsold-product salvage advantage, 
and neither one suffers a loss of goodwill due to possible unsatisfied customer demand. 
We use the following notations throughout the chapter. 
Rπ : retailer’s expected profit; 
Mπ : supplier/manufacturer’s expected profit; 
SCπ = Mπ + Rπ : supply chain expected profit;  
Iπ : integrated supply chain expected profit;  
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p: retail price per unit; 
w: wholesale price per unit; 
c: supplier production cost per unit; 
sM: salvage value per unit from the supplier; 
sR: salvage value per unit from the retailer; 
max{ , }M Rs s= s
≤
; 
b: buyback price per unit; 
m: markdown-money price per unit; 
Q: stocking quantity; 
x: stochastic market demand (r.v. and x 0); ≥
f(x): demand p.d.f. function , f(x)≥  0; 
F(x): demand c.d.f. function; 
E[.]: mathematical expectation w.r.t F(x). 
 To avoid any arbitrage opportunity to any agent, we have the following parameter 
constraints: c w  and . p≤ ≤ 0 ( )M Rs or s c b p< ≤ ≤
 
2.2.2 Supply Chain Decision Structures 
In a traditional supply chain structure, the supplier assumes the wholesale-pricing right, 
while the retailer specifies the stocking size whilst retaining the inventory. Vendor-
Managed Inventory (VMI) represents another structure in which the supplier is endowed 
with stocking decision rights, but the retailer still owns the inventory (see, e.g., Bernstein 
et al. 2005). The recent advances in information technology has lead to two more supply 
chain strategies: direct sales and drop-shipping practices. In direct sales practice, a 
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supplier overlooks the intermediary retailer and sells products directly to the end 
customers. Therefore, the supplier specifies the stocking size, owns the inventory and 
overstock risk. However, the choice of either a traditional structure, a direct sales 
structure, or a dual structure that combines both the traditional and direct sales practices 
may depend on the characteristics of the competitive circumstances such as customer 
acceptance of the products, see Chiang et al (2003), for instance.  
 In drop-shipping practice, the retailer assumes the marketing function to acquire 
customers through either the internet or local retail stores; the supplier is responsible for 
holding inventories and transferring products directly to the end customers. The supplier 
in general is associated with the stocking rights and owns the overstock risk, but it may 
not have the negotiation power in comparison to the retailer. See Netessine and Rudi 
(2004) for in-depth discussions. 
 Our supply chain decision structure is mainly defined based on the traditional 
supply chain features: the retailer owns the inventories; the overstock risk can be 
associated with either party, or both. In contrast, the decision structure incorporates a 
flexibility that, as noted earlier, each supply chain participant can specify the stocking 
decision or pricing decision, and either one can move as a Stackelberg leader regardless 
of who carries the bargaining power.  
 For the ease of exposition, we call the more powerful agent, the supply chain 
captain, and the other, the supply chain associate. At the beginning of a selling season, 
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the supply chain captain1 will choose a contract format to organize the supply chain; the 
supply chain associate will accept the contract type and participate in the supply chain if 
such contract and relevant terms assure enough profit. Since coordination generates the 
same total supply chain profit as the integrated system, and since the captain is capable of 
achieving more profit than the associate does from the supply chain, the captain thus has 
the incentive to seek coordination. In contrast, the supply chain associate will always try 
to maximize his own profit in the decision making process. 
 Stocking and pricing parameters are present in all three contract formats discussed 
here, namely, wholesale-price, buyback, and markdown-money contracts. A given agent 
may determine one or more (or none) of the above parameters in a decentralized supply 
chain. After the captain chooses a contract type, the contracting terms are determined 
over time, and thus, the contracting process can be modeled as a Stackelberg game.  
 Let H be a contract format chosen by the captain. Let HS  be the subset of contract 
terms (parameters) determined by the Stackelberg leader under the contract format H, and 
HS  be the remaining subset of contract terms chosen by the Stackelberg follower. 
Furthermore, let the index 1 refer to the captain and 2 refer to the associate. The supply 
chain decision structure can then be modeled as the following three-stage dynamic 
decision process: 
Captain (1) determines H  Leader (1 or 2) determines HS   Follower (2 or 1) 
determines HS . 
                                                 
1 In the remainder of this essay, we may use “captain” and “associate” to refer to the supply chain captain 
and supply chain associate, while “leader” and “follower” are used to refer to the Stackelberg leader and 
Stackelberg follower, respectively. 
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 Using P to represent the contract’s pricing term and D to represent the stocking 
term, we list ten possible dynamics in Table 2.1 for the supply chain decision structure, 
where an empty set (Ø) indicates the case when an agent is not making decisions. 
 The first two structures S1 and S2 in Table 2.1 represent the case of an integrated 
supply chain where either the supplier or the retailer makes both the stocking and the 
pricing decisions. However, the remaining eight structures are concerned with a 
decentralized supply chain. We investigate how these decision structures influence the 
choice of contracts for supply chain coordination in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
2.3 Integrated Supply Chains (S1 & S2) 
In an integrated supply chain, one agent makes all decisions for the entire supply chain, 
whereas in a decentralized supply chain, each agent is free to make its own decision. 
Thus, an integrated situation leads to the highest total profits possible in a supply chain, 
and we use the integrated supply chain as a benchmark to measure the performance of 
decentralized supply chains. 
Table 2.1: Ten Possible Decision Structures 
Structure Captain Leader Follower 
S1 Supplier Supplier (P, D) Retailer (Ø) 
S2 Retailer Retailer (P, D) Supplier (Ø) 
S3 Supplier Supplier (P) Retailer (D) 
S4 Retailer Supplier (P) Retailer (D) 
S5 Retailer Retailer (D) Supplier (P) 
S6 Retailer Retailer (P) Supplier (D) 
S7 Supplier Retailer (P) Supplier (D) 
S8 Supplier Supplier (D) Retailer (P) 
S9 Retailer Supplier (D) Retailer (P) 
S10 Supplier Retailer (D) Supplier (P) 
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 The integrated supply chain’s total expected profit: 
                 [ ] [ ]min[ , ] max[0, ]I pE x Q sE Q x cπ = + − Q− .  (2.3.1) 
The first term in the right hand side of (2.3.1) corresponds to the expected revenue; the 
second term corresponds to the expected salvage value from the unsold products; and the 
third is the total production cost. Upon simplification, 
0
( - ) - ( -  ) ( )
Q
I p c Q p s F x dxπ = ∫ .    (2.3.2) 
Since Iπ  is concave in , setting Q ( ) ( ) ( )Id dQ p c p s F Q 0π = − − − =  leads to 





,     (2.3.3) 
and  is  stock quantity that maximizes *IQ Iπ . With a given retail price, the maximized 












p s F x dx
− −
−∫ .     (2.3.4) 
     Both the optimized stocking quantity and supply chain profit increase in the 
salvage value s, the decision maker will thus assign the agent having the salvage 
advantage (not necessarily himself) the salvaging rights of the unsold products.  
 In any decentralized supply chain with each partner trying to maximize its own 
profit, we have *SC I
*π π≤ , where *SCπ  is the maximized profit of a decentralized supply 
chain. However, if a contract can be designed such that it enables the agent having the 
salvage advantage to salvage the unsold products, and  turns out to be the order size of 





π π=  can be attained, i.e., the supply chain can be 
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coordinated. We investigate how salvage advantage affects the choice of contracts for 
coordination in each of the decentralized supply chain decision structure in the following 
sections.  
 
2.4  S3: Supplier (Captain/Leader/P) vs. Retailer (Associate/Follower/D) 
In S3, the supplier is the supply chain captain who determines the contract type, as well 
as the Stackelberg leader in determining P, one subset of contract parameters; and the 
retailer (associate), plays the role of Stackelberg follower to choose the stocking size. We 
investigate three contract types for coordination: the wholesale-price contract, buyback 
contract, and markdown-money contract.  
 
2.4.1 Wholesale Price Contract 
Wholesale-price contracts have seen numerous applications in practice and they have 
been extensively explored in the literature, see Lariviere and Porteus (2001), and Cachon 
(2004) for recent work in this regard. Under a wholesale-price contract, the contract’s 
pricing term P refers to the wholesale price w. The two agents’ expected profit functions 
are, 
                                          Mπ =(w-c)Q (2.4.1) 
    Rπ =(p-w)Q-(p- sR)E[Q-x]
+= (p-w)Q-
0
( ) ( )
Q
Rp s F x d− ∫ x
SC Rp c Q p s E Q xπ
. (2.4.2) 
The supply chain expected profit is then 
           ( ) ( ) [ ]
+= − − − −
0
( ) ( ) ( )
Q
R= c Q p s F x dx− − − ∫ . (2.4.3) p
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Under S3, using backward induction, we first calculate the Stackelberg follower (retailer) 
stocking quantity that maximizes its own expected profit. Given a retail price and a 








.     (2.4.4) 
 The supplier has two options in choosing the wholesale price: either optimize the 
total supply chain profit function, or optimize its own profit function. With former option, 
substituting (2.4.4) in (2.4.3), solve  









p wp c F p sR F x dx
p s
π
− ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−
= − − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
∫ . (2.4.5) 
The first order optimality condition of (2.4.5) yields *w c= , and the second order 
condition reveals that  solves (2.4.5). However, the supplier achieves no profit 
when . Furthermore, because  in (2.4.4) increases in s, substituting 
*w c=
*w c= *Q *w c=  in 
(2.4.4), we have ( ) ( )* 1 * 1( ) /( ) ( ) /(R IQ F p c p s Q F p c p s− −= − − ≤ = − − )  and * *SC Iπ π≤  
due to . This result is due to the fact that the retailer is responsible for salvaging 
the unsold products under a wholesale-price contract whereas it does not have the salvage 
advantage ( ). Therefore, the supplier has to set 
Rs s≤ M
MRs s≤
*w c=  when , or Rs = s c
*w <  if 
 to ensure coordination. That is, the supplier would need to loose money in order 
to maintain the performance of the supply chain. 
Rs s< M
 On the other hand, the supplier may choose a wholesale price to maximize its own 
possible profit. Because the optimized wholesale price in this case is subject to the 
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inversion of the demand distribution, and a closed-form inversion of the c.d.f. is not 
always available for general distributions, we assume a uniformly distributed demand 
with f(x) =1/ 2β , where [0, 2 ]x β∈  and 0β > . In this case, the supplier’s optimized 
wholesale price is w*= ( ) /p c 2+ >c, which leads to the expected profit 
; the retailer orders * 2( ) /(2(M p c p sπ β= − − ))R ( ) /( )Rp c p sβ − −  and achieves 
; and the total supply chain profit is . 
For benchmarking, the relevant coordinating order size is 
* 2( ) /(4(R p c p sπ β= − − ))R
23 ( ) /(4( ))Rp c p sβ − −
2 ( ) /( )Rp c p sβ − −  and supply 
chain profit is  (given that ). Consequently, the supplier 
benefits by optimizing its own profit function even though the retailer orders 50% less 
than the coordinating order size; and the supply chain total profit is 25% less than the 
case of the coordinated supply chain. 
2( ) /( Rp c p sβ − − ) MRs s≥
 
2.4.2 Buyback Contract          
The buyback contract represents a major form of return policies, where the retailer can 
return the unsold products to the supplier and claim refund per item. Here we consider a 
full-return-partial-refund buyback contract. Our analysis follows Pasternack (1985), the 
first work discussing coordination using buyback contracts. In this case, 
                 Mπ =(w-c)Q-(b- sM) E[Q-x]





          0
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
Q
R p w Q p b E Q x p w Q p b F x dxπ
+= − − − − = − − − ∫ ,  (2.4.7) 
and the entire supply chain’s expected profit 
                          SC M Rπ π π= + = 0( ) ( ) ( )
Q
Mp c Q p s F x dx− − − ∫ . (2.4.8) 
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     The retailer’s optimized order quantity: 




.     (2.4.9) 
Substituting (2.4.9) in (2.4.8) and taking the first order derivative w.r.t. w, and letting 
/SCd dwπ =0, we have 
  * ( ) (M
M





.    (2.4.10) 
 The second order condition 2 2/SCd dwπ 0< . Therefore, if the supplier chooses a 
wholesale price of (2.4.10), the entire supply chain has the largest possible profit. Note 
that the optimized wholesale price is independent of the demand distribution and it 
increases in the buyback price.  
 The supply chain profit function (2.4.8) is not jointly concave in (w, b) when the 
supplier determines the prices, which allows the supply chain to be optimized with a 
series of solutions of (w, b) (also see Lariviere 1998); namely, the coordinated supply 
chain profit can be smoothly divided between the two agents by changing the buyback 
price. The determination of the buyback price depends on the bargaining power between 
the two agents. 
 Substituting (2.4.10) in (2.4.9) leads to . The supply 
chain is coordinated when the supplier has the salvage advantage ( ). Using  see 
(2.4.10), in (2.4.6) and (2.4.7),  
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∫ , (2.4.12) 
where 
1 ( )* 1
0









− −−= − − −
− ∫ . 
 It is clear that the supplier’s expected profit increases, while the retailer’s 
expected profit decreases in the buyback price. 
 Similar to Bernstein and Federgruen (2005), since 0 Ms b p< ≤ ≤ , set  
                          (Mb s p s )Mα= + − ,      (2.4.13) 
where [0,1]α ∈ . Substituting (2.4.13) back into (2.4.10)-(2.4.12) leads to 
                         , 
* ( )w c p cα= + − * *M SCπ απ= , 
* *(1 )R SCπ α π= − . (2.4.14) 
Proposition 2.4.1: Under a buyback contract: 
(a) If M Rs s≥ , the buyback contract coordinates the supply chain; when , the 
 supply chain cannot be coordinated with a buyback contract.  
R Ms s>
(b) Improving the buyback price increases the wholesale price, and thus increases the 
supplier’s profit at the expense of the retailer’s profitability. 
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(c) The optimal wholesale price is independent of the demand distribution. 
In the case when the retailer has the salvage advantage ( ), the buyback contract 
cannot coordinate the supply chain since < , even if the 
supplier optimizes the entire supply chain. 
Rs s≥ M
* 1(( ) /( ))MQ F p c p s
−= − − *IQ
 Intuitively, a higher buyback price allows more profit to the retailer in that the 
supplier compensates more to the retailer for the unsold products. However, a higher 
buyback price corresponds to a higher α  according to (2.4.13), and the retailer has to pay 
a higher wholesale price to the supplier, which allows the supplier to share a higher 
percentage of the supply chain profit at the expense of the retailer, see (2.4.14).  
 Due to the property (c) in Proposition 2.4.1, the supplier can contract with 
multiple independent retailers using a uniform buyback contract and save the cost for 
negotiating and managing terms of contracts with each retailer. More importantly, such a 
uniform contract policy is within the Robinson-Patman Act2, a Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) act that prohibits the seller from using discriminatory prices on 
buyers at the same functional level.  
Comment: Intuitively, the buyback price can be as low as  when Rs M Rs s> , but the 
supplier will incur a negative profit if the buyback price is less than Ms . To see this, let 
(Rb s p s )Rα= + − , then according to (2.4.10)-(2.4.12), 
( )* (1 ) ( )( ) /( )R Mw p p s p c p sα= − − − − − , ( )* *1 (1 )( ) /( )M R Mp s p s SCπ α π= − − − − , and 
( )* *(1 )( ) /( )R Rp s p sM SCπ α π= − − − . 
                                                 
2 From www.ftc.gov 
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That is, when , we have Rs b s≤ < M
*w c< , * 0Mπ < , and 
* *
R SCπ π> , the supplier achieves 
a negative profit. 
     To summarize,  in S3 if * *I BSC WSπ π π= ≥
*
C sMs = , where  and  
represent the expected supply chain profits when the supplier optimizes the entire supply 
chain using the buyback contract and wholesale-price contract, respectively. The supplier 





M Rs s≥ . Alternatively, 
 when , while the supplier has no incentive for coordination 
without any make-up arrangement such as a side payment. A markdown-money contract 
overcomes this shortcoming. 
* *




2.4.3 Markdown-money Contract 
The markdown-money contract is a form of return policy, see Tsay (2001), where the 
supplier allows the retailer to salvage the unsold products and keep the salvage values. 
Furthermore, the supplier pays a markdown price for each unsold unit to the retailer. 
Markdown-money contracts appear in situations such as when retailer has the salvage 
advantage. For instance, in the publishing industry, unsold products may have little 
salvage value while the overstock processing and transportation costs remain relatively 
high. In such a case, the retailer should salvage the unsold items instead of returning them 
to the supplier. The supplier only requests the retailer to tear off the front pages or other 
identifications of the unsold items to claim markdown credits.  
     The markdown-money contract has the following profit functions: 
0
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
Q
M w c Q mE Q x w c Q m F x dxπ
+= − − − = − − ∫   (2.4.15) 
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0
( ) ( ( )) [ ] ( ) ( ( )) ( )
Q
R R Rp w Q p m s E Q x p w Q p m s F x dxπ
+= − − − + − = − − − + ∫     (2.4.16) 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
Q
SC Rp c Q p s F x dxπ = − − − ∫ .    (2.4.17) 
Again, the retailer’s profit function is concave in Q and it can be shown that 






.    (2.4.18) 
Substituting (2.4.18) in (2.4.17) and with a given markdown price m, 
2
0 0
( )( )( ) 0
[ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] ( )
SC R
R R
d p s p wp c
dw p m s f x p m s f x
π − −− −
= +
− + − +
=
 
                                        
* ( ) (R
R







     The second order condition indicates  in (2.4.19) leads to a global maximum of 
(2.4.17). Substituting  into (2.4.18),  
*w
*w








 Furthermore, substituting (2.4.19) and (2.4.20) in (2.4.15) and (2.4.16),  
      
1 ( )* 1
0





m p c p c mF m F x dx
p s p s p s
π π
− −
− −− −= − =
− − −∫     (2.4.21) 
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− ∫ . 
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     To avoid any retailer arbitrage, the markdown price should be no larger than (p-
sR). Let ( )Rm p sα= − , where 0 1α≤ ≤ . Then, 
* ( )w c p cα= + − * *=, M MSCπ απ
*
MSC, and .  (2.4.23) 
* (1 )Rπ α π= −
 When α =0, m=0 and w=c, and the markdown-money contract is equivalent to a 
wholesale-price contract in which case the supplier achieves no profit. 
 Except for salvaging unsold products on the retailer side, the markdown-money 
contract functions the same way as a buyback contract as shown in (2.4.14) and (2.4.23). 
Consequently, the following conclusions can be similarly achieved under a markdown-
money contract. 
Proposition 2.4.2: Under a markdown-money contract, 
(a) When , a markdown-money contract coordinates the supply chain. 
Markdown price can be used to allocate the supply chain profit between the 
supplier and the retailer at any desirable proportion. 
Rs = s
(b) Increasing the markdown-money price increases the supplier’s profit at the 
expense of the retailer’s profitability. 
(c) The optimum wholesale price is independent of the demand distribution. 
 
Overall, we have the following conclusions for S3. 
Proposition 2.4.3: When the supplier has the salvage advantage ( M Rs s≥ ), the buyback 
contract coordinates the supply chain; if the retailer has the salvage advantage 
( ), the supplier will use a markdown-money contract for coordination. The 
wholesale-price contract shall not be used for coordination in S3. 
Rs s≥ M
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2.5 S4: Supplier (Associate/Leader/P) vs. Retailer (Captain/Follower/D) 
The preceding section investigated which contract can coordinate the supply chain when 
the supplier serves as both the supply chain captain and the Stackelberg leader. S4 has the 
same Stackelberg game hierarchy as in S3 except that the retailer acts as the captain. 
Before the selling season, the retailer chooses a contract type, the supplier is then allowed 
to announce the price(s) first, and the retailer follows with a stocking decision.  
 
2.5.1 Wholesale Price Contract 
Assuming that the retailer adopts a wholesale-price contract, S4 has the same profit 
functions as those of the S3 under a wholesale-price contract. (In fact, in all three types of 
contracts under analysis, the relevant profit functions remain unchanged among all eight 
decentralized structures.) The supplier sets a wholesale price such that c w . As the 
captain, the retailer will choose the stocking level to optimize 
the supply chain.  
p≤ ≤
* 1(( ) /( ))RQ F p c p s
−= − −
 Note that the supplier’s wholesale price is not an optimized result in this structure, 
and the retailer’s global stocking decision does not depend on the wholesale price. These 
observations may mislead us that the supplier can set any wholesale price it wants. 
However, if the wholesale price is set too high, the captain (retailer) can refuse to order 
from the supplier. There are two ways to determine the wholesale price: supplier bidding 
and negotiation. When the supply market is competitive, the retailer will choose a 
supplier that bids with the lowest wholesale price. Alternatively, the retailer can target 
one supplier and negotiate the wholesale price as low as possible; otherwise, she will 
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threaten not to contract with that supplier. Due to information symmetry, the supplier 
knows the retailer will order a large stocking quantity and it realizes that requesting a 
high wholesale price may leave itself substituted by other suppliers. The supplier will 
thus join the supply chain when the wholesale price goes beyond its target level.  
 The wholesale-price contract leads to the supply chain coordination if . 
Furthermore, in contrast to the markdown-money contract, a wholesale-price contract has 
fewer pricing terms such that it is easier to implement, and thus outperforms the 
markdown-money contract for coordination. 
R Ms s>
 S4 wholesale-price contract can well address decision processes in large retailing 
supply chains. For instance, Wal-Mart seeks orders from suppliers (like Chinese and 
Mexican vendors) that have the lowest wholesale prices (and in general having the lowest 
production costs). The suppliers’ profit margins minimal, but they are guaranteed with 
large orders by the retailer. 
 
2.5.2 Buyback Contract 
When M Rs s≥ , a buyback contract should be introduced for coordination. Like the 
wholesale-price contract, a buyback contract’s pricing terms, the wholesale price and 
buyback price, are not solely determined by the supplier. Rather, their determination 
relies on the firms’ bargaining power and the competitiveness of the supply market. The 
captain and follower (retailer) will choose the stocking size  to 
coordinate the supply chain.  
* 1(( ) /( ))MQ F p c p s
−= − −
 The S4 buyback contract distinguishes with that of S3 in that the wholesale price 
in S4 is no longer a function of the buyback price. That is, with a given wholesale price, 
   35
increasing the buyback price will benefit the retailer; if the buyback price is fixed, a 
higher wholesale price will benefit the supplier. As such, the retailer can negotiate a 
higher buyback price as well as a lower wholesale price to achieve more profit. This 
property is consistent with the common intuition that a high buyback price benefits the 
retailer while a high wholesale price benefits the supplier.  
Proposition 2.5.1: In S4, the wholesale-price contract coordinates the supply chain when 
, while the buyback contract is employed for coordination if Rs s≥ M M Rs s≥ . The 
determination of the contracts’ pricing terms depends on both firms’ bargaining power 
and the competitiveness of the supply market. 
 
 
2.6 S5: Supplier (Associate/Follower/P) vs. Retailer (Captain/Leader/D)     
In S5, the captain retailer serves as the Stackelberg leader in dictating the stocking size, 
and the supplier follows with a pricing decision. Similar to S4, the captain (retailer) can 
choose either a wholesale-price contract or a buyback contract for coordination per the 
salvage advantage, and commits an order quantity that optimizes the supply chain. 
However, the coordinating stocking decision in either contract is a function of the 
supplier’s production cost, which results in different stocking quantities with respect to 
different suppliers. Therefore, this decision structure leads to higher transaction costs for 
the retailer due to the fact that the retailer has to specify different stocking levels in light 
of a number of suppliers and negotiate prices with each of them. Meanwhile, the supplier-
bidding option in setting pricing terms is not applied in S4. Consequently, the S5 decision 
hierarchy is outperformed by S4 from the retailer’s perspective. 
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2.7 S6: Supplier (Associate/Follower/D) vs. Retailer (Captain/Leader/P) 
In S6, the retailer determines the contract type as well as the pricing terms, while the 
supplier follows with a stocking decision. Kandel (1996) analyzes the same structure but 
assumes both agents seek to maximize their own profits, We investigate situations when 
the retailer seeks coordination in its decision making. 
 
2.7.1 Wholesale Price Contract 
Under a wholesale-price contract, the retailer chooses a wholesale price w such that w>c 
to have the supplier involved in the supply chain, and the follower (supplier) determines a 
stocking quantity. Note that the supplier’s decision problem (2.4.1) is a linear function of 
Q, and the supplier bears no overstock risk in this case. Therefore, with a positive profit 
margin, the supplier has the incentive to supply a quantity of products that exceeds the 
supply chain optimum. On the other hand, the retailer bears the overstock risk, and will 
not accept the extra products above the stocking level that optimizes the supply chain, 
and in this case, coordination is developed if Rs s= . One point worth mentioning is, if 
the wholesale price is set below the supplier’s expectation, the supplier can stock less 
than , and thus coordination is not available in such a case. *IQ
 
2.7.2 Buyback and Markdown-money Contracts 
In contrast to wholesale-price contracts, the buyback contract and markdown-money 
contract may also develop coordination by sharing the overstock risk with the supplier. 
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Under a buyback contract, the supplier chooses a stocking level to maximize its own 
profit in (2.4.6), and we thus obtain, 






.      (2.7.1) 
Substituting (2.7.1) in the supply chain profit function (2.4.8) and under the first order 
conditions of optimality, 
   * ( ) (M
M





.    (2.7.2) 
Letting ( )M Mb s p sα= + − , where [0,1]α ∈ , then 
                       , 
* ( )w c p cα= + − Mπ =α
*
SCπ , Rπ =(1-α )
*
SCπ , (2.7.3) 
where 
1 ( )* 1
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− −−= − − −
− ∫ . The above results are 
identical to those of the S3 under a buyback contract. However, the captain (retailer) will 
seek a lower buyback price, i.e., a lowerα , to achieve more profit.  
 For markdown-money contracts, the mathematical results again remain identical 
to those in S3 under a markdown-money contract, that is, assuming ( )Rm p sα= −  for 
[0,1]α ∈ , 
                     w c* ( )p cα= + −
* *=, M MSCπ απ
*
MSC and , (2.7.4) 
* (1 )Rπ α π= −
where 
1 ( )* 1
0









− −−= − − −
− ∫ . When , the 
markdown-money also achieves coordination. Note that in contrast to the wholesale-price 
contract, the markdown-money contract not only complicates the transactions with an 
additional pricing term, more importantly, this contract type concerns the supplier since 
Rs s≥ M
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he has to pay for unsold products that are invisible (to the supplier)  and are salvaged by 
the retailer, which can lead to implementing challenges in practice. In this sense, the 
markdown-money contract is outperformed by the wholesale-price contract.   
Proposition 2.7.1: In S6, the wholesale-price contract outperforms the markdown-money 
contract for coordination when . A buyback contract can be used for 
coordination if 
Rs s≥ M
M Rs s≥ , and the retailer will decrease the buyback price to achieve more 
profit. 
 
2.7.3 Comparison: S4 versus S6 
In S4, the captain (retailer) acts as the Stackelberg follower in determining the stock size, 
which renders the supply chain coordinated in that the stocking quantity is the only 
decision variable that affects coordination. In contrast, the retailer has to set the price(s) 
to induce the supplier to choose a stocking quantity for coordination in S6.  
 In the case of a wholesale-price contract, the wholesale price will be negotiated 
such that c<w<p holds in both S4 and S6. The buyback contract’s pricing terms in S4 
and S6 are determined such that the wholesale price is independent of the buyback price 
in S4, while the latter independence dose not hold in S6. Therefore, the retailer can seek a 
high buyback price as well as a low wholesale price in S4. In contrast, the retailer has to 
set a low buyback price that induces a low wholesale price to share a high supply chain 
profit in S6. To summarize, S4 assures the retailer a higher degree of control for 
coordination in comparison to S6. 
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2.8 Structures S7 and S8 
The supplier captains the supply chain and determines the quantity in both Structures S7 
and S8. In S7, the supplier introduces a contract type first, the Stackelberg leader 
(retailer) then chooses a pricing decision, and then the captain (supplier) commits a stock 
level. To coordinate the supply chain, the supplier determines  
if , or  if 
* 1(( ) /( ))RQ F p c p s
−= − −
Rs s≥ M
* 1(( ) /( ))MQ F p c p s
−= − − M Rs s≥ , which are independent of the 
contract’s pricing terms, while the price determination depends on the relative bargaining 
power of the agents. 
 In S8, the supplier specifies a contract type, as well as a supply quantity at either 
 or . Similar to S7, the 
determination of the pricing term(s) is based upon the agents’ bargaining power. 
* 1(( ) /( ))RQ F p c p s
−= − − * 1(( ) /( ))MQ F p c p s
−= − −
 Even though Structures S7 and S8 have different Stackelberg hierarchies, the 
supplier always chooses a stocking quantity that optimizes the supply chain, regardless of 
his Stackelberg position. This observation is consistent with the statement in Stackelberg 
(1934) that sometimes even the firms themselves do not know who is the leader and who 
is the follower. 
Proposition 2.8.1: In structures S7 and S8, a wholesale-price contract can be chosen to 
coordinate the supply chain if the retailer has the salvage advantage, while a buyback 
contract can be used for coordination when the supplier has the salvage advantage.  
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2.9 Structures S9 and S10 
In Structures S9 and S10, the supply chain captain assumes the Stackelberg follower 
position in choosing contracts’ pricing term(s). However, the profit functions of the 
supply chain are independent of w, b, and m, see (2.4.3), (2.4.8), and (2.4.17). Therefore, 
coordination cannot be induced by captain’s pricing decisions under any contract type in 
this case. On the other hand, the agent who acts as the leader (the supplier in S9 and the 
retailer in S10) to choose Q cannot expect what the follower’s reactions will be since the 
follower’s objective profit function is independent of the pricing terms. To summarize, 
S9 and S10 are infeasible structures. 
 
2.10 Conclusions and Future Research 
In this chapter, we relaxed the standard assumption in the literature that a supply chain 
captain does also act as the Stackelberg leader. This allows us to investigate ten possible 
supply chain decision structures in terms of coordination. In each decentralized decision 
structure, we analyzed the effect of contract type, namely, the wholesale-price contract, 
buyback contract, or markdown-money contract, and their role in achieving supply chain 
coordination.  
 The use of a particular contract type to achieve coordination depends not only on 
the agent having the overstock salvage advantage, but also upon the supply chain 
decision hierarchy. For example, when the retailer captains the supply chain and acts as 
the Stackelberg follower to determine the stocking level (S4), coordination can be 
achieved using either a wholesale-price contract or a buyback contract. 
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 As for the supply chain captain, the Stackelberg leadership is not always 
necessary for coordination and for seeking more profit. For example, the retailer captains 
the supply chain in Structures S4, however, being the follower allows the retailer to have 
the products with the lowest wholesale price using supplier-biddings.  
 In the case of a buyback contract, the general intuition is that a higher buyback 
price leads to a higher wholesale price, thus assuring more profit for the supplier. In the 
foregoing analysis, it is shown that the wholesale price is not necessarily a function of the 
buyback price (as in the case of S4 and S7). Therefore, a retailer can seek a high buyback 
price along with a low wholesale price, and a supplier may retain a low buyback price as 
well as a low wholesale price. 
 In S3, the markdown-money contract has to be used for coordination when the 
retailer has the salvage advantage; while in other decentralized structures, the wholesale-
price contract outperforms the markdown-money contract due to its easier implementary. 
This conclusion partially explains why the markdown-money contract is uncommon in 
practice. 
     Several extensions deserve further efforts. We assumed that the retail price is 
exogenously determined in this chapter. It is also useful to consider how (or whether) 
coordination can be achieved in different decision structures when the retail price is 
endogenously determined. Agents are assumed risk neutral in our research. In contrast, if 
either or both agents are risk averse, questions such as how can coordination be reached, 
and how the profit is split within the supply chain, are worthy of further research. 
Another noteworthy extension is the analysis on information structure. For instance, 
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when private information exists, how both agents react in different structures will be an 
interesting issue to explore. 
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Chapter 3: 
Supply Chain Performance with Power Imbalanced Suppliers 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We study a supply chain (or supply channel) where multiple suppliers/manufacturers 
supply substitutable products or components to a common downstream firm or retailer. 
Such multi-agent supply chains widely exist in manufacturing, retailing, and service 
industries. Manufacturers seldom produce all parts by themselves, but outsource them to 
upstream suppliers. For example, Dell and Hewlett Packard produce personal computers 
with components supplied by a variety of upstream suppliers; General Motors and Ford 
assemble vehicles but outsource most parts to numerous independent upstream firms. 
Retailers such as Home-Depot, Best-Buy, and Wal-Mart, carry multiple brands in the 
same product categories. In the service industry, for instance, Dutch bank ABN AMRO 
in 2005 outsourced its IT operations to five providers with entire contracts valued at $ 
2.24 billion over five years (Gibson 2005).  
 In this chapter, we focus on the influence of each agent’s decision-making power 
on the strategic interactions and performance within a multi-supplier-one-retailer supply 
chain. Such interactions in a supply chain are typically modeled as either two-stage 
Stackelberg games or one-stage non-cooperative games with all suppliers sharing an 
equal or balanced decision-making power over/under the retailer (Choi 1991). That is, all 
suppliers are assumed to act as either Stackelberg leaders or followers over the retailer, or 
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all supply chain parties move simultaneously in decision-making. We relax this 
conventional assumption to examine situations when suppliers have an unequal decision- 
making power over each other so that one or more suppliers can exercise Stackelberg 
leadership over the other suppliers. This relaxation allows us to extend and generalize the 
results of the multi-supplier-one-retailer power-balanced supply chain studied by Choi 
(1991). As a result, five additional configurations for supply chains under power 
imbalance are analyzed in this chapter by modeling them as either two-stage or three-
stage Bertrand Stackelberg games. This chapter focuses on such questions as supply 
chain performance and stability, effects of product substitution, and strategies used by 
agents with different decision-making power.  
 Choi (1991) examines a retailing channel consisting of two suppliers and one 
retailer and analyzes three possible channel configurations with power balanced 
suppliers; namely, the Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) structure in which both suppliers 
act as the Stackelberg leaders over the retailer, the Retailer Stackelberg (RS) structure 
where the retailer assumes leadership with respect to power-balanced suppliers, and the 
Vertical Nash (VN) structure in which all participants have equal decision-making power. 
The above supplier balanced-power structures have also been empirically tested, for 
instance see, Besanko et al. (1998) who use the VN model to validate price endogeneity, 
or Sudhir (2001) who investigates vertical interactions within the context of MS and VN 
structures. 
 Kadiyali et al. (2000) also study and empirically test interactions within a multi-
supplier-single channel using a somewhat generalized Choi’s power models, but the 
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supplier-supplier interactions are subsumed within the retailer’s interaction with each 
supplier.   
 Besides Choi (1991)’s two-supplier-single-retailer case, channel interactions have 
been studied in terms of the number of agents involved, for instance, for the case of one 
supplier and one retailer, Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and Moorthy (1987) investigate 
channel coordination mechanisms, Netessine and Rudi (2004) investigate drop-shipping 
in terms of three power structures similar to Choi (1991). Given a channel with one 
supplier and two retailers, Ingene and Parry (1995) consider supply chain coordination 
with “quantity discounts” and “two-part tariff”. With two suppliers and two retailers, 
McGuire and Staelin (1983) study agents’ pricing strategies under exclusive dealership 
structures, and starting from that, Moothy (1988) answers the question “why strategic 
interaction among suppliers makes it possible for decentralization to be a Nash 
equilibrium strategy”; Choi (1996) and Trivedi (1998) both consider agents’ pricing 
interactions when retailers carry products from both suppliers; Lee and Staelin (1997) 
study the value of Stackelberg pricing leadership within the concept of vertical strategic 
interaction under different channel structures.  
 However, in the cases of one-supplier-two-retailer or two-supplier-two-retailer 
channels, to the best of our knowledge, the existing literature has not considered the 
effect of power imbalance within the supplier or retailer groups. 
   On the other hand, multi-supplier-single-retailer supply chains have been studied 
quite extensively in the context of complementary products being offered by different 
suppliers. For instance, in assembly supply chains with a common assembler (retailer), 
Gerchak and Wang (2004) assume all suppliers move simultaneously as either 
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Stackelberg leaders or followers over the common assembler. They study supply chain 
coordination and systems performance issues under contracts such as wholesale price, 
buyback, or revenue sharing contracts, see Cachon (2003) and Lariviere (1999) for 
excellent reviews on supply chain contracts. Granot and Yin (2004) study system 
performance and supplier coalition under the assumption of suppliers having equal power 
for two cases: first, suppliers move to set wholesale prices and the retailer follows by 
setting the stock size; second, the retailer moves first in setting wholesale prices and 
suppliers follow with stocking decisions who also retain the overstock risk. Wang (2005) 
also studies system performance, but assumes the retailer serve as the Stackelberg leader 
over the suppliers, and suppliers can move either simultaneously or sequentially in 
pricing and production decisions; also see Jiang and Wang (2005). Bernstein and 
DeCroix (2004) investigate multi-tier assembly systems in which the downstream firm(s) 
holds higher decision-making power over the upstream agents, and all firms at the same 
tier move simultaneously. Carr and Karmarkar (2005) and Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) 
study competition within a multi-echelon assembly supply chain with a deterministic 
demand assumption, where the former assumes a VN configuration while the latter 
assumes a MS power structure. 
 In the preceding assembly systems models, production quantities at each echelon 
remain the same as (or proportional to) the final assembly quantities. In contrast, in many 
other situations, it is the common operational practice that downstream firms order 
substitutable components from different upstream suppliers. Under product substitution, 
however, modeling and characterizing multi-supplier-one-retailer supply chain in 
stochastic environment turn out to be quite complex. Consequently, analysis of vertical 
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interactions in such an environment is usually simplified via a one-supplier-one-retailer 
newsvendor model; see, for instance, Cachon (2003) and Lariviere (1999).  
 In this chapter, we study a multi-supplier-one-retailer power-imbalanced supply 
chain in which suppliers offer substitutable products. We assume a linear deterministic 
demand function that captures the substitution effects (which is also a measure of product 
competition). We obtain closed-form equilibrium results that facilitate insight on supply 
chain performance under power imbalance and substitution effects. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first instance of a detailed analysis for such supply chains. In the 
sequel, the following conclusions are reached in this chapter: 
(1) With increasing product substitution, a multi-supplier-one-retailer supply chain can 
achieve coordination asymptotically under a simple wholesale pricing mechanism. 
(2) Each supplier’s profit consistently decreases when products become more 
substitutable even if the suppliers dominate the retailer, whereas the retailer benefits 
from a high degree of substitution regardless of the supply chain power structure. 
(3) A “niche” supplier is not necessarily an underdog in the presence of a larger supplier 
when seeking to increase the share of its supply chain profit under certain decision 
power structures. 
(4) In the case of multiple suppliers, “profit percentages” can characterize their relative 
power differences more accurately than the respective “absolute profits”.  
(5) Certain power-imbalanced channels are shown to dominate others. Moreover, we 
show that Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg channels are no longer 
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stable structures (as claimed in Choi, 1991) when suppliers are able to behave as if 
they are power imbalanced.  
 It is a common practice that a firm orders from power-imbalanced (or 
asymmetric) multiple suppliers for satisfying its end demands for products and services, 
and thus, such systems deserve in-depth investigation. For example, a PC assembler such 
as Dell or Hewlett Packard use CPUs from different suppliers, but Intel dominates the 
CPU supplier market. Wal-Mart offers customers national-brand beverages such as Pepsi 
and Coca-Cola along with beverages supplied by niche players. IBM Global services 
pockets $1.87 billions from Dutch bank ABN AMRO’s $2.24 billion IT outsourcing 
contracts, and the four other IT service providers share the remaining outsourcing budget.  
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
model and relevant assumptions along with different supply chain structures; Section 3 
provides derivations and closed-form equilibrium results under power-imbalance; 
detailed comparisons of different supply chain structures are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 focuses on supply chain performance as well as channel structure stability. 
Section 6 concludes the chapter. The required notation is introduced as it becomes 
necessary. 
 
3.2 The Model and Decision Hierarchies 
Consider a supply chain where one retailer carries substitutable products from two 
suppliers (supplier 1 and supplier 2) in a single business season. Suppose the two 
suppliers are asymmetric in size and assume that Supplier 1 is larger than supplier 2. This 
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size difference affects the Stackelberg pricing positions that suppliers can have, as 
illustrated next. The supplier i is paid a wholesale unit price wi by the retailer who in turn 
charges a retail price pi from the end customers, where the supplier index )2,1(  =i  
denotes the specific supplier, and thus the specific product i sold to the retailer. 
 Consider the linear deterministic function for retailer demand given by, 
(i i i j iq a bp t p p= − + − ) , i, j=1,2, i≠j,            (3.2.1) 
where the coefficient  represents the product “market base” (see Tsay and 
Agrawal, 2000) that is invariant to the retail prices,  represents product i’s demand 
sensitivity on its own retail price, and  denotes the degree of product substitution, 
which accounts for the effect of retail price differences of the two substitutable products. 
Note that a unit price discount offered by both suppliers simultaneously thus results in 
both demands  increasing by b units. In the sequel, (3.2.1) is normalized by 




21  and qq
0=t  represents the case when the 
two products are completely independent, and as t increases, the degree of product 
substitution (hence, the competition between the two products) increases.  
 Demand models similar to that in (3.2.1) have been used by Choi (1996), 
McGuire and Staelin (1983), Trivedi (1998), Tsay and Agrawal (2000), for instance. It 
must be noted that Choi’s (1991) demand function, namely, i iq a bp tp j= − +  has resulted 
in the counter-intuitive implication that equilibrium retail prices grow when products 
become more substitutable in the structures analyzed by the author. The demand-price 
relationship on (3.2.1), in contrast, can be shown to eliminate such implications. 
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 We shall use the following notation: M iπ  is supplier (manufacturer) i’s profit, Rπ  
is the retailer’s total profit in selling both product types, SC iπ  is the total supply chain 
(SC) profits generated due to (only) product i, and Iπ  is the total SC profits due to both 
product types. Denoting the unit production costs by  wholesale prices by  and 
assuming the stock size to be equal to the (deterministic) demand, the following 
expressions hold: 
,ic ,iw
                                                       ( )Mi i iw c qiπ = −  (3.2.2) 
                                                      (3.2.3) 
2
1





                                                       ( )SC i i i ip c qπ = −  (3.2.4) 







=∑ . (3.2.5) 
Furthermore, it is assumed that information is symmetric across the supply chain, 
and each supply chain agent makes decisions to maximize his/her own profit.  
 
3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure 
Given the information symmetry in the supply chain, the chronological order in which 
each agent is making pricing decisions impacts the relative profit potential of each agent. 
Such a chronology in the decision hierarchy is often the result of the relative power that 
each agent holds in the supply chain. Accordingly, for the two-supplier-one-retailer 
supply chain, eight possible relative power configurations can be proposed, as depicted in 
Figure 3.1, where M1 and M2 denote the suppliers 1 and 2, respectively, and R denotes  
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Figure 3.1 Supply Chain Decision Hierarchies 
the retailer. If M1 holds more (bargaining) power than M2 in the supply chain, it is 
represented by M1→M2 in Figure 3.1. M1↔M2 indicates that M1 and M2 both have 
equal decision-making power. The eight distinct structures are marked (S1) through (S8).  
 Note that the structures (S1), (S2), and (S3) correspond to both suppliers having 
equal power, which is the case considered in Choi (1991). In this case, both suppliers 
move simultaneously over each other in making decisions. (S1) is representative of two 
large suppliers with equal power supplying to a small retailer, whereas (S2) illustrates the 
retailer being relatively larger compared to two equally-sized suppliers. (S3) is concerned 
with the case when all three agents share an equal decision-making power such that no 
one can gain pricing leadership over the others. (S1), (S2), and (S3) are appropriately 
termed Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Vertical Nash 
(VN), respectively. Choi (1991) offers in-depth discussions, including the existence of 
unique Nash equilibria for these three relative power structures.  
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 In contrast, structures (S4) through (S8) underscore the presence of power 
imbalance between the suppliers. For example, when a very large retailer such as Wal-
Mart selling beverages provided by a large supplier such as Coca-Cola or Pepsi, along 
with beverages produced by smaller niche suppliers, the retailing supply chain power 
structure typically resembles that in (S4). On the other hand, in (S5), supplier 1 has power 
over a mid-sized retailer who carries products from both his and of another relatively 
smaller supplier that has relatively less power than the retailer in the supply chain. 
Structure (S6) models a situation when both suppliers are more powerful than the retailer 
along with the relatively larger supplier M1 further dominating the supplier M2. We offer 
three-stage Bertrand Stackelberg game-theoretic analyses of these structures. 
 On the other hand, Structures (S7) and (S8) have only two decision tiers and they 
can be modeled as two-stage games. Unlike (S1) and (S2) where the two suppliers are 
power-balanced, in (S7) and (S8), the retailer shares equal power with one supplier. In 
(S7), Retailer has balanced power with the supplier 1 and they both act as Stackelberg 
leaders over Supplier 2, whereas in (S8), the retailer has balanced power with Supplier 2 
and they both play the role of Stackelberg followers in the supply chain. 
 In the ensuing analyses, the following terminology will be applied: the member 
with the highest hierarchy in decision making, i.e., the agent who moves first, is termed 
the Stackelberg leader, while the member with the lowest hierarchy, i.e., moving last, is 
termed the Stackelberg follower. When there exists an intermediate decision maker, as in 
the case of (S4), (S5), and (S6), such an agent is termed a Stackelberg middler. 
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3.3 Equilibrium Analysis of Supply Chain Structures 
Let us first consider the structure (S4) where the retailer is the leader, the supplier 1 is a 
middler and the supplier 2 is a follower. The retailer chooses the retail margins m1 and m2 
at the first stage of decision making by taking both suppliers’ reaction functions into 
account, where m1=p1-w1 and m2=p2-w2; at the second stage of decision making, the 
middler M1 chooses a wholesale price w1 that is conditional on the retail margin m1, as 
well as by taking into account of M2’s reaction function; finally, at the third stage, the 
follower M2’s wholesale price is conditioned on both decisions m2 and p1, where 
p1=w1+m1. Using backward induction, M2’s reaction function * 2Mπ  is obtained as 
{ }        222221221* 2 :),,(max:),(
2
mwpmppmp MwM =−= ππ ,                       (3.3.1) 
where  
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2( , , ) ( ) ( )[ (M )]p p m w c q w c a p t p pπ = − = − − + −                      (3.3.2) 
under the demand function in (3.2.1), normalized with .1=b  By expressing 2Mπ  as a 
function of the single decision variable  (3.3.1) is a univariate unconstrained concave 
maximization problem. The first order optimality condition, i.e., setting the derivative to 
zero, yields 
,2w
,0)2)(1( 22212 =−−+++ wmcttpa  and thus, supplier 2’s optimal prices are  
   and *2 2 1 2 2[ ( 1)( )] /[2(w a tp t c m t= + + + − +1)] 2
* *
2 2p w m= + .   (3.3.3) 
Substituting (3.3.3) in the supplier 1’s (middler’s) problem, and given the retail margin 
m1, the supplier 1’s profit * 1Mπ  is determined by solving  
                   { },:),,(max:),( 1111*2111*2* 1
1







211 pptpacwqcwmppM −+−−=−=π                  (3.3.5) 
Supplier 1’s problem in (3.3.4) is also a concave univariate maximization problem, and 
thus, the first order condition of optimality yields 
  .  (3.3.6) * 2 2 21 2 1 2 2 1 1[ 2( 1) ( )( ) ( 4 2)( )] /[2( 4 2)]w ta t a t t m c t t c m t t= + + + + + + + + − + +
Given both suppliers’ reaction functions  and  in (3.3.3) and (3.3.6), respectively, 
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Therefore, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. 
 The optimized retail margins ( , ) are determined from the retailer’s first 





Rπ  to zero, which yields  
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Using forward substitution, optimal wholesale prices in (3.3.3) and (3.3.6) are then 
obtained as 
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3.3.1 Analysis of Structure (S4) 
Note that the demand parameter  reflects customer brand loyalty and market share, and 
a larger supplier in general has a larger market base over small suppliers. Meanwhile, a 
larger supplier in general has a smaller unit production cost  due to possible economies 
of scale. The equilibrium results in (3.3.8)-(3.3.11) capture not only the effect of power 
imbalance in Structure (S4), but also effects due to brand loyalty as well as economies of 
scale in production. In order to better understand the effects due to power imbalance 
alone, we suppress these other effects by setting 
ia
ic
aaa == 21  and  for the 
remainder of this section. In this case, the equilibrium results are simplified as 
ccc == 21
                                                 1* *1 2 ( ) /m m a c= = − 2 , (3.3.12) 
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1 Note that it may mislead the reader that the retail margins are equal to half of the difference between the 
market base and production cost. This is due to the normalization that b=1 was set as mentioned earlier, for 
if not, margins are . * *1 2 ( ) / 2m m a bc b= = −
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 where  is necessary to ensure non-negative production quantities in (3.3.15). Also, 
it follows that the retailer charges the same retail margin  from both 
suppliers in (S4). The following proposition establishes the qualitative aspects of the 
equilibrium behavior, where the “integrated system” refers to the two-supplier-single-
retailer supply chain being controlled by a single agent (i.e., a coordinated supply chain). 
ca >
* *
1 2 ( ) /m m a c= = −
Proposition 3.1: In structure (S4), 
(1) Both suppliers’ retail prices monotonically decrease in t and they reach the 
integrated system’s retail prices as .∞→t  
(2) Both wholesale prices monotonically decrease in t and they reach the respective 
unit production cost as .∞→t  
(3) Both product quantities increase in t. 
(4) Both suppliers’ profits monotonically decrease in t and they vanish 
asymptotically. 
(5) The retailer’s profit monotonically increases in t and it reaches the total supply 
chain profit as .∞→t  
(6)  The total supply chain profits increase in t and converges to the integrated 
system profit as .∞→t   
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1Mdπ / <0, dt
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2Mdπ / dt <0, 
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Rdπ / >0, and dt
*
SCdπ / >0. Furthermore, if the optimal retail prices of a corresponding 
integrated supply chain are denoted by 
dt
*
1( )Ip  and 
*
2( )Ip  for the two products, then it can be 










= . As a result, the 
decentralized structure (S4) resembles an integrated system when the two products are 




= = , with  the retailer capturing 
the entire supply chain profit.  
 It can be further shown that 
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and thus,  and  are convex (and decreasing) in t. Therefore, at lower levels of t, a 
change of substitution drastically affects the retail prices, consequently, the profits of 
each supply chain agent changes substantially. In contrast, at relatively higher levels of t, 







 Considering the retailer profit *Rπ  as the combination of profits 
*
1Rπ  (of product 














1Mπ  for all . When the two products are completely un-
substitutable, i.e., , we have 
0>t






1Mπ . That the Stackelberg middler M1 
achieves a lower profit than the (less powerful) follower M2 results from the fact that the 
retailer charges the same retail margin from both suppliers, whereas M2 charges lower 
wholesale unit price than M1 does, which in turn, leads to a lower retail price and thus a 
higher stock quantity for M2 products so as to offset the loss of lower wholesale price. 






2π+  and 
* *
2 2SC M Rπ π π= + . Thus, 
* */Mi SCπ iπ π  represents the profit percentage 
that the supplier i achieves from his own products. It follows that 
                       
2 3 2 2
* *
1 2 2 2
(8 43 36 8)( )
64( 1)( 4 2)SC SC
t t t t a c
t t t
π π + + + −− = −
+ + +
0≤ , (3.3.22) 
             
2 2
* * * *
1 1 2 2 2 3 2
2 ( 4 2)/ /
(2 11 6)(4 25 34 12)M SC M SC
t t t
t t t t t
π π π π + +− =
+ + + + +
.0≥  (3.3.23) 
Thus, the profit contribution from M1 products to the supply chain is less than that of M2 
products; however, the ratio of profit that supplier M1 shares from the sale of his own 
products is larger that that of M2, as stated below. 
Proposition 3.2: The supplier power imbalance that exists in (S4) allows the more 
powerful supplier to obtain a higher “profit percentage” from his products, in 







It follows that when products are completely un-substitutable, i.e., t  retail prices of 
both product types are higher in all structures (S1)-(S8) compared to those of an 
integrated supply chain, see Table 3.1. Let the subscript 
Proposition 3.3: In structures (S1) through (S8), equilibrium retail prices of both 
products decrease monotonically in t; moreover, they coincide with the corresponding 
integrated supply chain’s retail prices as products become completely substitutable, i.e., 
as  
Retail prices follow the results in Proposition 3.1 in all eight structures, the proof of 
which follows analogously by referring to Table 3.1:  
3.4.1 Properties of Retail Prices and Retail Margins 
Equilibrium analyses of all structures in Figure 3.1 can be performed analogously to that 
of (S4), presented in the preceding section. The resulting optimal solutions, along with 
those of the integrated supply chain (coordinated by one agent), are summarized in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in the end of this chapter, where  is set to be 0 for ease of exposition. 
In the remainder of this section, properties of these structures are investigated.  
3.4 Analysis of Remaining Structures 
 
substitution. However, the total dollar profit in the supply chain due to the small 
supplier’s products dominates that of the large supplier. 
=n
0
 represent the 
particular structure under consideration, and let =n represent the case of the integrated 
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Note: (1) S0 represents the integrated system, S1-S8 represent Structures 1 to 8, respectively; 
          (2) Subscripts 1 & 2 for prices and production quantities correspond to supplier 1 and 2 products, respectively.  
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Note: The total supply chain profits, ** * *1 2SC M M Rπ π π+ +
* / 2SC aπ =. For S0, .=π
 
supply chain. Thus, optimal retail price  and retail margin  refer to supplier i’s 





2,1=i 0 t≤ < ∞
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                            (3.4.3) * * * * * * *21 41 31 71 81 11 51 61m m m m m m m m= > ≥ > ≥ ≥ =
                           , (3.4.4) * * * * * * *22 42 52 72 32 82 12 62m m m m m m m m= = = > ≥ > ≥
where equality in “≥” holds only when 0=t . 
 (3.4.1) and (3.4.2) indicate that all three-tier power structures lead to the same 
highest retail prices for both products, while the supplier power-balanced two-tier 
structures (S1) and (S2) have the same second highest retail prices for both suppliers. In 
contrast, when the three agents are power balanced, i.e., (S3), retail prices are the lowest. 
Structures (S7) and (S8), where the two suppliers are power-imbalanced, the supplier 
having the same power level as the retailer obtains the lower retail price. 
 Interestingly, whenever the retailer has power advantage over a supplier, she will 
charge the same highest retail margin (i.e., a/2) while those suppliers that dominate (or 
power-balanced with) the retailer will be charged less than a/2. This is evident in results 
for structures (S2), (S4), (S5), and (S7). 
 When the two suppliers are power imbalanced, i.e., structures (S4)-(S8), as 
follows from Table 3.1,  





















Thus, the more powerful supplier’s products command a higher retail price than those of 
the weaker supplier in all of the imbalanced structures except (S7), where the retailer and 
supplier 1 equally dominate supplier 2. In terms of retail margins, the retailer charges 
higher margins from supplier 2 than from supplier 1 unanimously, except in (S4) where 
the retailer acts as the leader of both suppliers and charges the same margin. 
 
3.4.2 Wholesale Prices and Order Quantities 
Similar to the analysis of (S4) in Section 3.3, it can be shown that the wholesale prices 
decrease in t for all eight structures.  
Proposition 3.4: In structures (S1)-(S8), both suppliers’ wholesale prices monotonically 
decrease in t and they are asymptotic to the production costs as products approach 
perfect substitution, i.e., .∞→t   
For each power-imbalanced structure, for 0 t≤ < ∞ , 









where equality in “≥” holds when .0=t  That is, the more powerful supplier charges a 
higher wholesale price in all structures where suppliers are power imbalanced. However, 
the order quantities have the following property: 
Proposition 3.5: In structures (S1)-(S8), both suppliers’ production quantities 
monotonically increase in t.  
Under an integrated system, the optimal order quantity is a/2 for each product 
type. For the eight structures of the supply chain in Figure 3.1, it can be shown that as 
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product substitution becomes perfect ( ∞→t ), only in (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S7) that the 
optimal quantity reaches a/2 for each product type. However, for all remaining structures 
(S4), (S5), (S6), and (S8), supplier 1 obtains a lower order quantity (while supplier 2 
obtains a higher order quantity) than a/2 under perfect product substitution. In the case of 
independent products, i.e., 0=t , all eight structures result in order quantities smaller 
than a/2 for either product type. 
 Furthermore, for 0 , it turns out that the order quantities when suppliers 
are power imbalanced follow the relations 
t≤ < ∞









The equality of “≤” in (3.4.8) holds only when .0=t  Note that supplier 2 delivers more 
quantity than supplier 1 in all of the imbalanced structures, except (S7) where the more 
powerful supplier is power balanced with the retailer, formally stated as: 
Proposition 3.6: When two power-imbalanced suppliers sell through a common retailer, 
the small supplier captures more market share (more products sold) than the large 
supplier except when the larger supplier is power balanced with the retailer.  
 
3.5 Supply Chain Performance Analysis 
In this section, we focus on how the supply chain profits are allocated by agent type or 
the product type under different power-imbalanced SC decision hierarchies. We employ 
both absolute, as well as relative, dollar profits allocations. The following result holds for 
absolute dollar profits. 
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Proposition 3.7: Both suppliers’ profits monotonically decrease, while the retailer’s 
profit increases as the degree of product substitution t increases. Moreover, the total 
supply chain profit monotonically increases in t. When the two products are completely 
substitutable, i.e.,  the retailer captures the entire supply chain profit, which thus 
coincides with the case of an integrated supply chain coordinated by the retailer. 
,∞→t
Proof.  Using the equilibrium results in Table 3.2, these results can be proven in a 
straightforward manner.  
The above result is consistent with those in Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, where both 
the retail prices and wholesale prices decrease in product substitution t in either product 
type. Proposition 3.7 explains why it is a common practice for a retailer to carry products 
from competitive suppliers regardless of her power position. By carrying multiple 
products from the same category to spur competition, the retailer improves her own 
profits, as well as the entire supply chain profits. When markets are highly competitive 
(hence t is sufficiently large), being a retailer proves to be more profitable than being a 
supplier, which thus justifies why large suppliers open retail outlets in addition to selling 
through external retailers. 
3.5.1 Supply Chain Structure Dominance 
Given the relative profit potential of each agent in different SC structures, we focus on 
whether certain decision structures can emerge dominant over the others. Identifying such 
dominating structures helps developing insight as to their economic stability. To this end, 
we define a certain weak form of dominance, termed PSD-criterion, or power 
sacrifice/splitting dominance, when agents are allowed to reconfigure themselves so as to 
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make a transition from one structure to another. “Power-sacrifice” refers to the case when 
an agent willingly moves to a lower tier, and “power-splitting” refers to an agent having a 
power-sharing agent who moves to a lower tier. In a structure transition, agents are 
allowed to move only towards a lower-tier direction. For instance, when (S7) emerges in 
a transition from (S8), M2 is subject to “power-sacrifice”, the retailer R is subject to 
“power-splitting”, and M1 is subject to a “power-sacrifice”. 
Definition 3.1 (Dominance): The structure (Sk) is said to PSD dominate structure (Sj), 
denoted by (Sk) ≻ (Sj), if and only if every agent who is subject to “power-sacrifice” or 
“power-splitting” in the transition from (Sj) to (Sk) is better-off in structure (Sk) 
compared to structure (Sj), for .8,...,1, =kj  
In applying the PSD criterion, an agent is assumed “better-off” if his/her profit increases. 
Thus, in the previous example of structure transition from (S8) to (S7), all three agents 
must be better off in (S7) compared to (S8) in order for (S7) ≻ (S8) to hold. Notice that 
PSD may also be applied under different metrics such as relative profit or percentage 
supply chain profit allocation. However, the focus here is on absolute profits. 
Furthermore, we define a structure to be stable as follows: 
Definition 3.2 (Stability): Structure (Sk) is said to be a “stable structure” if and only if 
(Sj)  ⊁  (Sk),   .  ,8,...,1 kjj ≠=
The complete set of PSD dominance relationships as well as stability results are 
presented in the following theorem. 
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Theorem 3.1:  
i) (S6) ≻ (S1)  for 0 , and  (Sj) ⊁ (S1), jt≤ < ∞ ≠ 6, for  Moreover,  (S6) ⊁ (Sj), 
j 1, for all  
.0≥t
≠ .0≥t
ii) (S4) ≻ (S2) for 0 , and  (Sj) ⊁ (S2), jt≤ < ∞ ≠ 4, for  Moreover,  (S4) ⊁ (Sj), 
j 2, for all  
.0≥t
≠ .0≥t
iii) (S3) ≻ (S4)  for 1.47 , and  (Sj) ⊁ (S4),  j11.59t≤ ≤ ≠ 3, for  Also,  (S3) ⊁ (Sj), 
j 4, for all  
.0≥t
≠ .0≥t
iv) (S8) ≻ (S5)  for  , and  (Sj) ⊁ (S5), j0.92t > ≠ 8, for  Moreover,  (S8) ⊁  (Sj), 
j 5, for all  
.0≥t
≠ .0≥t
v) Structures (S3), (S6), (S7), and (S8) are stable for 0 t≤ < ∞ ; structure (S4) is stable 
for ; moreover, structure (S5) is stable for [1.47,11.59]t∉ 0 0.92t≤ < . 
Proof. (i): Transition (S1)→(S6) involves M1 subject to power-splitting and M2 subject 




and thus,  (S6) ≻ (S1) holds. Furthermore, the transition (S1)→(Sj), j 6, t, cannot 
assure that all involved agents are better off, and thus,  (Sj)  ⊁  (S1), j≠ 6, ∀ t. Similarly, 
transition (Sj)→(S6), j 1, 
∀
∀ t, cannot assure that all involved agents are better off, 
which implies  (S6)  ⊁  (Sj), j≠ 1, ∀ t. 
 Claims (ii), (iii), and (iv) can be proven analogously. 
 For claim (v), any transition from structures (S3), (S6), (S7), or (S8) to other 
structures cannot assure all agents with power-sacrifice and/or power-splitting are better 
off, and thus, these structures remain stable for 0 t≤ < ∞ . As shown in (iii), (S3) PSD-
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dominates (S4) for 1.47 , while no other structure PSD-dominates (S4). 
Therefore, structure (S4) is stable for 
11.59t≤ ≤
[1.47,11.59]t∉ . Using (iv), it also follows that (S5) 
is stable for 0 .  0.9t≤ ≤ 2
 
When suppliers are power-balanced as in (S1) or (S2), it is more profitable for the 
suppliers to re-align themselves as if they are power-imbalanced (S6 or S4, respectively) 
since (S6) ≻ (S1) and (S4) ≻ (S2), see Theorem 1, i.e., (S1) and (S2) are not stable 
structures. This finding is consistent with the empirical studies, for instance, Kadiyali et 
al. (2000), where the authors claim that there is difficulty in supporting the existence of 
SC structures (S1) and (S2) when real-world data is used. 
 According to Theorem 3.1, (S4) is stable only for sufficiently low levels or high 
levels of product substitution, while (S5) is stable only when t is sufficiently small. Thus, 
it appears that as product competition intensifies under (S4), the retailer and the powerful 
supplier are better off by moving to (S3); however, if the competition is allowed to 
escalate to sufficiently high levels (i.e., ), the stronger supplier will become 
worse off compared to staying under (S4). Considering (S4) ≻ (S2) for , and since 
(S3) ≻ (S4) for , it can be concluded that for relatively fair competition, a 
dominant retailer (as in S2) would be willing to let the power advantage vanish and share 








3.5.2 Supply Chain Profit Allocation 
As it develops, the more powerful agent may not make the most profit in the case of a 
power imbalanced supply chain. Figure 3.2 depicts the case for the two suppliers, where 
the relative profit allocation is plotted against the product substitution (competition) over 
different structures. It is evident that the two suppliers achieve supply chain profit quite 
unevenly. Notably, the weaker supplier reaps more profit in structures (S4) and (S6) for 
 and in (S8) for (=,0>t *tt > 3 / 8). Only in (S5), (S7), or in (S8) under sufficiently low 
levels of substitution, the stronger supplier commands a higher profit relative to the 
weaker supplier. Also note that an even allocation of profits between the two suppliers is 
not possible under any of the power-imbalanced scenarios, provided product substitution 
is significant. 
 
Figure 3.2:  * * *1 1 2/( )M M Mπ π π+
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 As for the retailer’s profit, as shown in Figure 3.3, the retailer enjoys a larger 
fraction of the supply chain profits as substitution increases while suppliers are left with 
increasingly smaller percentage of the supply chain profits across all structures. However, 
at very low level of product competition, the retailer surrenders this profit superiority 
over the suppliers in structures (S1), (S6), and (S8), where the retailer’s decision power is 
the weakest. 
 Which supplier’s products contribute the most to the supply chain profits? This 
question is addressed in Figure 3.4. For supplier-power-balanced structures such as (S1), 
(S2), and (S3), both product lines equally contribute to supply chain profits. However, 
under power imbalance in suppliers, it is evident from Figure 3.4 that products from the 
 




Figure 3.4: * *1 2( )SC SC SC
*/π π π−  
weaker supplier are responsible for most profits, and that contribution increases with 
product substitution for all structures except (S7). In (S7), nevertheless, the additional 
contribution from the products of the more powerful supplier diminishes and equalizes 
with that of the weaker supplier when substitution is increased significantly. 
Although the weaker supplier’s products are responsible for most profits in the 
supply chain, as Figure 3.5 illustrates, the weaker supplier retains only a smaller 
percentage of those profits compared to the powerful supplier. This is indeed true across 
all structures, with (S5) having the highest disparity in profit sharing for the weak 
supplier. As competition increases, however, such disparities begin to disappear. Thus, 
the following characterization holds: 
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Figure 3.5: * * * *1 1 2/ / 2M SC M SCπ π π π−  
 
Proposition 3.8: The relative power advantage of a supplier (over the other supplier) 
allows him to retain a higher percentage of the profit generated by his/her own products 
(in the supply chain) consistently at all levels of product substitution and in all supply 
chain structures. 
 
While the individual agents in a supply chain could be better/worse-off under 
power imbalance, the supply chain as a whole can benefit under certain power balanced 
structures. It can be shown for that 0>t
                        * * * * * * * *3 7 8 1 2 4 5SC SC SC SC SC SC SC SC 6π π π π π π π π> > > = > = = , (3.5.1) 
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which implies that the most power-imbalanced structures generate the lowest total profits 
for the supply chain. In contrast, when suppliers are offering independent products, i.e., 
t=0,  
                         * * * * * * * *3 7 8 1 2 4 5SC SC SC SC SC SC SC SC 6π π π π π π π π> = > = = = =  (3.5.2)  
holds, and thus, supplier power imbalances may not necessarily degrade the supply chain 
total profits. 
 
3.6 Conclusions and Discussions 
In this chapter a two-supplier-one-retailer supply chain was investigated when suppliers 
have unequal decision-making power, thus allowing one supplier to become a 
Stackelberg leader over the other supplier. This consideration results in a set of eight 
different channel structures, of which five have not been studied in the literature. We 
model such situations as either two-stage or three-stage Bertrand Stackelberg hierarchies, 
or one-stage non-cooperative games. Using a linear deterministic demand model that 
allows for product substitution effects, we investigate important questions such as supply 
chain performance, effects of product substitution, and structure dominance and stability.  
 Most notably, the following conclusions are reached: (i) A multiple-supplier-one-
retailer supply chain performs as an integrated system when the degree of product 
substitution is sufficiently large, (ii) The suppliers’ profits consistently decrease when 
products become more substitutable, even if suppliers dominate the retailer. The retailer 
benefits from a high degree of substitution in all possible structures, (iii) In a two-
supplier-one-retailer supply chain, a small (niche) supplier may achieve more profit than 
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a large supplier, (iv) “Absolute profits” cannot reflect the power structure of the multi-
supplier supply chain. However, “profit percentage” of each agent can represent the 
relative power differences more accurately. (v) Certain supply chain structures are 
dominant over the others, which implies that the relevant agents are better-off in making 
a transition to dominating channel decision structure. Moreover, there exist channel 
structures that exhibit stability in that a structure transition is not likely to occur so long 
as agents are profit maximizers. In this context, both the Manufacturer-Stackelberg (S1) 
and the Retailer-Stackelberg (S2) structures (Choi, 1991) do not exhibit stability.  
 Relatively small suppliers are, in general, regarded as underdogs in sharing profits 
in the supply chain. However, the present analysis reveals that a small supplier may even 
achieve more profit than the relatively large supplier, which provides one explanation 
why niche suppliers thrive in markets that are dominated by giant suppliers. Empirical 
studies based upon power-balanced supplier structures indicate certain inconsistency 
between the theoretical models and observed real data, and in this context, our study 
offers a realistic alternative viewpoint.    
 One limitation of the analysis in this chapter is the assumption of a linear 
deterministic demand model, which essentially simplified the analysis resulting in closed-
form statistics. Under the first three structures of Figure 3.1, Choi (1991) shows that 
derivation of closed-form results is analytically challenging when certain forms of 
nonlinear demand models are used. Furthermore, unique Nash equilibrium is no longer 






Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts when 
Retailer Sells Store-Brand Products 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Store brands, or private labels, are those for which a retailer has control in pricing, 
stocking, shelf placement, and marketing promotions. Store brands have emerged as 
important sources of profits and have fostered better negotiation positions for the retailer 
with outside suppliers. Therefore, store brands have seen substantial inroads in a variety 
of product categories and have resulted in significant growth over the years. ACNielsen 
Inc. (2005)1 recently released its annual investigation on store brands across 38 countries 
and 80 product categories, where it is stated that store-brand products represent a 17% 
value-sales share and a 5% growth over the previous year. In particular, the North 
American store brands had a share of 16%, and its growth was even more significant at 
7%.  
 Academic research on the subject of store brands has also gained considerable 
attention. For example, Cotterill et al. (2000) investigate the relationship between the 
store-brand market share and influences such as pricing behaviors, retail concentration, 
and cross-price elasticity; Hoch and Banerji (1993) discuss factors such as quality, 
advertising, and price discounts that affect store-brand success; Raju et al. (1995) 
                                                 
1 We appreciate the permission of ACNielsen to cite the data. 
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investigate the impact of competition on the introduction and performance of store 
brands; Chintagunta et al. (2002) and Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) offer studies on the 
effect of store-brand entry; Sayman et al. (2002) and Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) 
study strategies for store-brand positioning in the retailer-manufacturer negotiations; 
Mills (1995) and Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) examine the role of store brands in 
transaction negotiations, for instance. 
 However, the existing literature primarily focuses on identifying and evaluating 
factors, as supported by empirical evidence, which influence the store-brand market share 
and the incentives on store brands. Furthermore, many such studies assume a wholesale-
price contractual arrangement between the outside suppliers and retailers, i.e., retailers 
pay a wholesale unit price to suppliers and keep all the sales revenues. To the best of our 
knowledge, academic literature on does not consider using contracts for coordination in 
supply chains involving store-brands. A supply chain is said to be coordinated if 
individual decisions turn out to be optimal for the supply chain as a whole. This chapter 
addresses the question of coordination under the application of revenue-sharing contracts 
by which the retailers commit to share the sales revenue with the suppliers. Revenue-
sharing contracts have seen significant applications in practice. For instance, (outside) 
suppliers such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola pay lump-sum fees to Wal-Mart for using shelf 
space, and they are compensated with certain percentages of sales revenues from their 
products. Consequently, the presence of store brands can significantly affect the supplier-
retailer interactions, and thus, such effects deserve in-depth analysis.  
Revenue-sharing contracts are common in many applications, e.g., video rental 
industry (Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Dana and Spier 2001), assembly systems (Gerchak 
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and Wang 2004), and E-Commerce (Wang et al. 2005). Cachon and Lariviere (2005) 
show that revenue-sharing is a possible contractual agreement for supply chain 
coordination. See Cachon (2003), Lariviere (1999), and Sahin & Robinson (2002) for 
excellent reviews on various mechanisms for coordination. 
 Besides the interaction between store brands and non-store brands, channel 
interactions have been studied in terms of the number of agents involved. For instance, 
for the case of one supplier and one retailer, Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and Moorthy 
(1987) investigate channel coordination under “quantity discounts”. With two suppliers 
and one retailer, Choi (1991) studies supplier-retailer interactions under different 
decision-making power structures, and starting from that, Kadiyali et al (2000) consider a 
certain generalization of Choi’s power models to measure supplier-retailer interactions in 
which supplier-supplier interactions are subsumed. Given a channel with one supplier and 
two retailers, Ingene and Parry (1995) consider coordination with “quantity discounts” 
and “two-part tariff”. With two suppliers and two retailers, McGuire and Staelin (1983) 
study agents’ pricing strategies for exclusive dealership structures where each retailer 
carries only products from one supplier. In this context, Moothy (1988) answers the 
question, “why strategic interaction among suppliers makes it possible for 
decentralization to be a Nash equilibrium strategy.” Choi (1996) and Trivedi (1998) both 
consider agents’ pricing interactions when retailers carry products from both suppliers; 
Lee and Staelin (1997) study the value of Stackelberg pricing leadership within the 
concept of “vertical strategic interaction” under different channel structures.  
In this chapter, we investigate channel interactions when the retailer carries both the 
national-brand and store-brand products. Assuming the retailer has more bargaining 
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power in the supply chain, we model the situation as a Stackelberg game under a 
revenue-sharing contract.  
This study shows that a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract in which the 
retailer pays a wholesale unit price, along with a certain percentage of sales revenue to 
the supplier, can allocate the supply chain profit flexibly by adjusting the revenue-sharing 
rate. In contrast, the profit division under a (usual) wholesale-price contract, or a one-
parameter revenue-sharing contract, is uniquely determined in terms of the relative 
demand functions and production costs. A one-parameter revenue-sharing contract refers 
to the case when the only contractual parameter is the percentage of sales revenue paid by 
the retailer to the supplier.  
It follows that when the revenue-sharing rate is fixed, the retailer will let the 
supplier determine his retail price and make decisions to optimize her own profit 
function, i.e., non-coordinating decision. When the supplier specifies his wholesale price, 
a non-coordinating wholesale-price contract is the optimal choice for the retailer. It is 
also shown that when the supplier determines his retail price, and when the retailer can 
specify both the wholesale-price and the revenue-sharing rate, the retailer’s coordinating 
decisions lead to Pareto improvement in contrast to her non-coordinating decisions. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the model 
assumptions; Section 4.3 offers the integrated system as a benchmark; two scenarios for 
the revenue-sharing contract implementation are discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5; 
Section 4.6 discusses the agents’ performance and decision strategies; Conclusions are in 
Section 4.7. 
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4.2 Model Assumptions 
Consider a one-supplier/manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain within a single business 
season. The outside supplier sells national-brand products through a large retailer, and is 
paid with a wholesale unit price, along with a certain percentage of retailer’s revenue 
from his products. The outside retail price and wholesale price can be determined by 
either the supplier or the retailer, while the revenue-sharing rate is determined based upon 
negotiation. Besides carrying outside products, the retailer also sells her store-brand 
products and determines that retail price by herself. We assume the store-brand products 
are produced from an integrated system managed by the retailer, thus ignoring the 
dynamics involving the retailer and any suppliers of the store-brand products. We 
consider two decision scenarios, S1 and S2, for analysis: 
i. Scenario (S1):  The retailer determines the outside (product) wholesale price as 
well as the retail price for the store-brand product, while the supplier chooses the 
retail price for his own products. 
ii. Scenario (S2):  The retailer determines the outside retail price and the retail price 
of store brands, while the supplier chooses his own wholesale price. 
 In each scenario, the outside supplier makes decisions to maximize his own profits, 
while the retailer has the option of either maximizing the total supply chain profits 
(termed a coordinating decision), or optimizing her own profits (termed a non-
coordinating decision). Given the assumption that the retailer has more decision power 
(than the outside supplier), the retailer is assumed to play the role of Stackelberg 
leadership.  
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Therefore, under S1, the retailer first issues the store-brand retail price ( 0p ) and the 
wholesale price (w), and then, the outside supplier follows with his retail price ( 1p ). On 
the other hand, under S2, the retailer first determines 0p  and 1p , and then the supplier 
follows with his decision w. The following additional notation is employed throughout 
the chapter. 
SCπ : Supply chain profit, 
Mπ : Outside supplier profit, 
Rπ : Retailer profit, 
0q : Retailer store-brand product demand, 
1q : Outside product demand, 
r: Revenue-sharing rate for outside product and 0 1r≤ ≤ , 
0c : Store-brand production cost ( 0 0c p≤ ), 
1c : Outside production cost ( 1 1c p≤ ). 
It is assumed that the information is symmetric across the supply chain, the store-
brand and national-brand products are substitutable, and both product demands are linear 
deterministic in prices. In particular, the two products are assumed to have the following 
format for their demand functions: 
   0 0 0 0q a b p tp1= − +  (4.2.1) 
    1 1 1 1q a b p tp0= − +  (4.2.2) 
where  and  represent “market bases” of the two products, i.e., the demand if all 
prices are set to zero, which thus describe customer brand loyalty of each product type; 
0a 1a
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0b  and  measure the demand sensitivity on relative retail prices; t indicates the degree 
of product substitution or competition, where a larger t represents a higher degree of 
substitution (higher product competition). It is necessary that all demand parameters are 
nonnegative, i.e., 0, and 
1b
0 1 0 1, , , ,a a b b t ≥ 0 1min{ , }t b b≤  for demands to be well-behaved, 
see Ingene and Parry (1995). We further assume that 0i i ia b p− ≥ , for , which 
indicates that demands are positive even when there is no competition (t=0). 
0,1i =
 The profit functions are then given by, 
                                             0 0 0 1 1( ) (SC 1)p c q p c qπ = − + −  (4.2.3) 
                                               1 1((1 ) )M r p w c q1π = − + −  (4.2.4) 
                                             1 1 0 0( ) ( )R rp w q p c q0π = − + −  (4.2.5) 
 
4.3 Integrated System 
We first obtain the optimal results for an integrated (or centrally coordinated) system in 
which one agent makes decisions for the entire supply chain. We use these results as 
benchmarks for performance comparison with the corresponding decentralized supply 
chain, where each agent makes decisions independently (in a hierarchical manner). For a 
decentralized supply chain, if the individual decisions lead to the same optimal 
performance of the integrated system, then the decentralized supply chain is said to be 
coordinated.  
The integrated-system profit SCπ is thus a function of the two retail prices  and 
, and the first order partial derivatives are 
0p
1p
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     0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0
2 2SC a b c tc b p tp
p
π∂
= + − − +
∂
, 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
1
2 2SC a tc b c b p tp
p
π∂ , (4.3.1) = − + − +
∂
and the second order partial derivatives are 















π∂ 0= − <
∂


























  = 20 14 4b b t 0− > , 
since , which guarantees a unique solution to the problem: 0 1min{ , }t b≤ b SCpp π max10 ,
. 
Setting the gradient of 0=SCπ , the first order conditions yield 













a t a bp c
b b t
+  , (4.3.3) = +
−
and substituting (4.3.3) in (4.2.1) and (4.2.2), we have 
                           *0( ) 0 0 0 1
1 ( )
2I
q a b c tc= − + , *1( ) 1 1 1 0
1 ( )
2I
q a b c tc= − + , (4.3.4) 




1( )Ip  and  represent the optimal store-brand retail price 
and order quantity, and outside retail price and order quantity, respectively, for the 
integrated-system, whose total maximized supply chain profit 
*
1( )Iq
* * * *
( ) 0( ) 0( ) 1( ) 1( )SC I I I I I
*p q p qπ = + .   
 The optimal retail prices consist of corresponding production costs and parameters 
of both demand functions. Also, note that 
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< , (4.3.5) 
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< , (4.3.6) 
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*
( )
0 0 0 1
0
1 1( ) 0
2 2
SC I a b c tc
c
π∂





1 1 1 0
1
1 [ ] 0
2
SC I b c a c t
c
π∂
= − − <
∂
. (4.3.8) 
Proposition 4.3.1: The following hold for the integrated system at the optimum: 
(a) Both retail prices are increasing in the corresponding production costs; both 
order quantities are decreasing in the corresponding production costs and 
increasing in the competitor’s production costs.  
(b) Retail prices are increasing in the market bases ( ) and the degree of product 
substitution t; also, retail prices decrease with increasing  and .  
0a , 1a
0b 1b
(c) The total supply chain profit decreases in production costs  and . 0c 1c
 
4.4 Revenue-Sharing Contracts under Scenario (S1) 
Under S1, with a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract, the retailer chooses the 
wholesale price as well as the store-brand retail price, and the outside supplier specifies 
his own retail price. The outside supplier’s profit maximization decision is conditional on 
the revenue-sharing rate and the retailer’s decisions ( 0 ,p w ). Therefore, we first solve the 
outside supplier’s problem: Mp π max1
, which yields 
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                     0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1
( , , , ) (1 ) 2 (1 )Md p p r w t r p b r p b w a b c
dp 1
π
= − − − − + + , (4.4.1) 
and setting 0 1 1( , , , ) /Md p p r w dpπ =0,  
   * 1 0 1 11
1
(1 )( ) ( )
2 (1 )
r a tp b w cp
b r
− + + −
=
−
.     (4.4.2) 




4.4.1 The Case of Retailer Non-Coordinating Decisions (RNCD) under S1 
In a non-coordinating decision framework, the retailer utilizes the supplier’s (reaction) 
retail price function in (4.4.2) to choose both the wholesale price and the retail price for 
store-brand products such that her own profit function is maximized, i.e., Rwp π max,0
: 
               
*
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 11
2
( ) (1 )( 2( , )
2(1 )
R b w c r a tc a r tp r tp b wp r
w r
π − + − − − − + +∂
=
∂ − −
) , (4.4.3) 
       
*
2 2 2 21
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0
2 2
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
( , ) ( ) (2 2 4
( 2 4 2 2 2
R p r r a t t p r a b b b c t p c t tb w b b p
p
c t b wt b b p a t tb c t p b b c a b
π∂
= + + + + − − −
∂
+ + + − − − − −
)
)
 . (4.4.4) 
The second order partial derivatives are 

































,         (4.4.5) 
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which ensures that the first order solutions jointly maximize the retailer’s profit function. 
That is, 
                                           
* 1 0 1




a t a bp c










( 2 ) (4 ) ( 2
(2 )S NC
)A C r C A r Bc Cw
r B





where 2 30 1 1 0 0 1 0A a b t a t c t b b c t= + + − , 
2
0 1 12 2
2B b b b t= − , and , and 
. In (4.4.6) and (4.4.7), the subscript pair (S1, NC) refers to the scenario S1, 
and that it is in a non-coordinating decision. Substituting  and  in the 
outside retail price function (4.4.2) gives  
0 1 1 0 1C a b t a b b= +
, , 0A B C ≥
*
0( 1, )S NCp
*
( 1, )S NCw
                          *1( 1, ) 1
1 ( 2 ) (3 )
(2 ) 2S NC
Bp A C r C
B r
c A⎧ ⎫= − + + −⎨ ⎬− ⎩ ⎭
. (4.4.8) 
Note that  
*










< ,                                             (4.4.9) 
which implies that r=1 yields the lowest outside retail price under the case of RNCD, that 




a t a bp c




, which is identical to the corresponding price 
in the integrated system, see (4.3.3). Therefore, the retailer’s non-coordinating decision 
increases the outside retail price in comparison to the integrated system. Meanwhile, the 
revenue-sharing contract reduces to a wholesale-price contract with *( 1, ) 1S NCw c= when 
r=1. Also note that 
      
* 2 2
( 1, ) 0 1 1 0 1 1 01 1 1
2 2
1 0 1 1 1
2
2 ( ) ( 2) 2 ( 2)
S NCdw a b t a b b a t tc r rb c a
dr b b b t b r b r
+ − − +−
= + +
− − − 2
( 4 2) ,   (4.4.10) 
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and                              
2 *









< , (4.4.11) 
i.e., 
* 2 3
( 1, ) 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
2
1 0 1
2 ( ) ( ) 0
2 ( )
S NCdw b c b b t b t a b c c t
dr b b b t





 when r=1, which is the smallest 
value of (4.4.10). Therefore,  for *( 1, ) /S NCdw dr > [0,1]r∈ , the non-coordinating 
wholesale price increases in the revenue-sharing rate. 
     When r=0 (thus, the outside supplier retains all sales revenue), it follows that 
<0, which implies that the retailer is paid a (wholesale) price of *( 1, )S NCw
* 2 2 1
( 1, ) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1| | [ ( ) ][2( )]S NCw b a b c t c a t b b t




in this case. 
     Under the retailer non-coordinating decision (RNCD) framework, the store-band 
retail price (4.4.6) is identical to that of the integrated system, see (4.3.3), while the 
outside retail price decreases in r due to (4.4.9). The following relationships hold on 
order quantities.  
Proposition 4.4.1: When  and under RNCD, 0 r≤ < * *1( 1, ) 1( )S NC Ip p> ,  and 
 hold. 
* *
0( 1, ) 0( )S NC Iq > q
q* *1( 1, ) 1( )S NC Iq <
Retailer non-coordinating decisions lead to the outside supplier delivering a quantity less 
than that of the corresponding integrated system, while the retailer delivers more store-
brand products at all levels of product substitutability, which thus improves the retailer’s 
market share. The outside supplier’s profit in this case is   
  * ( 1, ) 1 1 1 02
1
1 1 [
( 2) 4M S NC




+ ,     (4.4.12) 
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and thus                        
* 2











which implies that under RNCD, the outside supplier achieves his maximum profit of 
 when r=0.  21 1 1 0 1[ ] (1a b c tc b
−− + 16 )
) The retailer pockets a profit of _ ( 1, ) 1 1(R M S NC rp w qπ = −  from outside products, and 
using the non-coordinating wholesale price and retail prices in (4.4.6)-(4.4.8), it can be 
shown that 
                       
2
* 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
_ ( 1, ) 2
0 1
[ ][ 0
4(2 )( )R M S NC
a b c tc a b a t t c b b c
r b b t
π − + + + −= >
− −
] ,          (4.4.14) 
i.e., the retailer profits from carrying the outside products for all [0,1]r∈ . 
     Let ( 1, )R S NCπ  represent the retailer’s total profit from selling both products, i.e., 
. Then, for * * * * *( 1, ) 1 1 0 0 0( ) (R S NC rp w q p c qπ = − + −
*) [0,1]r∈ , 
                        ( ) 1* 2( 1, ) 1 1 1 0 1/ [ ] 4 ( 2)R S NCd dr a b c tc b rπ
−2 0= − + − > . (4.4.15)  
That is, an increasing revenue-sharing rate enhances the retailer’s total profit. However, 
because   is independent of r, see (4.4.6), and an increasing r leads to a lower 
 as in (4.4.9), as well as a lower store-brand order quantity, a higher revenue-
sharing rate undermines the store-brand’s profitability. 
*
0( 1, )S NCp
*
1( 1, )S NCp
 
4.4.2 The Case of Retailer Coordinating Decisions (RCD) under S1 
Suppose the retailer makes decisions to optimize the total supply chain profit in an 
attempt to achieve coordination. Substituting  of (4.4.2) into the total channel profit *1p
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function SCπ  in (4.2.3), the gradient expressions of SCπ  are:  
                        0 0 0 12
( , ) (1 )( ) ( )
2(1 )
SC 1p w t r c p b c r w
w r
π∂ − − +
=
∂ −
− , (4.4.16) 
and,  
2 2
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
2 2
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 10
0 1
(2 3 2 2 4 )
( 3 4 2 2 2( , )
2 ( 1)
SC
r a t p t c t a b b b c b b p b c t
c t p t b b p a b b b c b wt a tp w
p b r
π
⎧ ⎫+ − + + − −⎪ ⎪
⎨ ⎬




The second order partial derivatives of SCπ  are 
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.     (4.4.19) 
Therefore, the supply chain profit function is strictly concave in 0( , )p w  for 10 <≤ r . 
Setting 0( , ) 0SC p wπ∇ =  yields 




a t a bp c





and                                          *( 1, ) 1
1 [( ) ]S Cw A Bc r AB
= + − , (4.4.21) 
Subscript S1 refers to the scenario and C refers to retailer’s coordinating decision (RCD) 
framework. Observe that  is identical to that of the integrated system.  *0( 1, )S Cp
 Observe that the store-brand retail price is independent of revenue-sharing rate, see 
(4.4.20). In contrast, the wholesale price monotonically increases in r due to (4.4.21). As 
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such, the highest wholesale price under a “coordinating revenue-sharing” contract equals 
the outside supplier’s production cost. On the other hand, when r=0, , 
i.e., the supplier pays a wholesale price to the retailer for receiving all the sales revenue.  
*
( 1, ) / 0S Cw A B= − ≤
     Substituting (4.4.20) and (4.4.21) back into the outside retail price in (4.4.2), we 
have 




a t a bp c





 Optimal retail prices (4.4.20) and (4.4.22) are identical to those of the 
corresponding integrated system. That is,  
Proposition 4.4.2: When the retailer makes decisions to optimize the overall supply 
chain profits, the two-parameter revenue-sharing contract achieves coordination. 
 Note that as , the retailer attains all the sales revenue and the two-parameter 
revenue-sharing contract reduces to a wholesale-price contract, which leaves no profit for 
the supplier due to 
1r →
*
( 1, ) 1S Cw c=  in this case. Alternatively, if 
1
1( )r A A Bc
−= + , 
then =0, i.e., the two-parameter revenue-sharing contract simplifies as a one-
parameter revenue-sharing contract.  
*
( 1, )S Cw
Proposition 4.4.3: When the outside supplier determines his retail price, the wholesale-
price contract cannot be used for coordination, and the one-parameter revenue-sharing 
rate is uniquely determined by the costs and demand parameters of both agents.  
 For products ordered from the outside supplier, 
                 * * *( 1, ) 1( 1, ) ( 1, ) 1 1( 1, )[(1 ) ]
*
M S C S C S C S Cr p w c qπ = − + − ,                (4.4.23) 
and                                , (4.4.24) * * *_ ( 1, ) 1( 1, ) ( 1, ) 1( 1, )(R M S C S C S C S Crp w qπ = −
*)
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where * ( 1, )M S Cπ  is the outside-supplier’s profit, and  is the retailer’s profit from 
selling outside products. Noting (4.4.20)-(4.4.22), we have, 
*
_ ( 1, )R M S Cπ
          
2





r b c a c t
b
π − − −= ,           (4.4.25) 
 
1 1 1 0
2 2 3
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0*
_ ( 1, ) 2
1 0 1
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{ [ ] (1 ) (1 ) ( )}
4 ( )R M S C
a b c c t
b b a b c a t r b t c c t r b t a b c




− + − + + − + −⎝ ⎠=
−
0> , (4.4.26) 
Letting , 0r =
2





b c a c t
b
π − −= , 
2 3
* 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
_ ( 1, ) 2
1 0 1
[ ][
4 ( )R M S C
a b c c t a t c t a b t b b c t
b b b t





That is, when the supplier captures all sales revenue from his products, the retailer still 
profits from outside products since *( 1, ) /S Cw A B= − ≤  holds, that is, the supplier pays a 
unit price of  to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer can always profit from selling 
outside products when the supplier chooses the retail price. Also note that for the 
retailer’s total profit ,  
/A B
*
( 1, )R S Cπ
                                  
* 2




R S Cd a b c c t
dr b
π − +
= > ,  (4.4.28) 
i.e., a higher revenue-sharing rate increases the retailer’s total profit. 
 
4.5 Revenue-sharing Contracts under Scenario (S2) 
Under the decision scenario (S2), the outside supplier chooses the wholesale price 
conditioned on his retail margin and the store-brand retail price, given that the retailer 
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specifies both retail prices. Let m be the retail margin of outside products, then p1=w+m 
and , and the outside supplier’s decision problem is, 1 /dp dw =1 max M
w
π , where 
        1 1 1 1 1 1[(1 ) ] [(1 )( ) ][ ( ) ]M r p w c q r w m w c a b w m tp0π = − + − = − + + − − + + . (4.5.1)  
The corresponding first-order and second-order conditions of the outside-supplier profit 
function are 
                  0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
( , ) (1 )( ) [(1 ) ]Md p p r a b p tp b r p w c
dw
π
= − − + − − + − , (4.5.2) 
                                             
2




= − − < . (4.5.3) 
Therefore, the first order solution leads to the unique optimal wholesale price 
                           * 1 1 1 01
1
(2 ) (3 2 ) (2 )a r b p r tp rw c
b
− − − + −
= + . (4.5.4) 
 
4.5.1 The Case of Retailer Non-Coordinating Decisions (RNCD) under S2 
In the non-coordinating decision framework, the retailer chooses retail prices to optimize 








2(2 )2 0R r tb
p b
π∂ −






2 (3 ) 0R b r
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and the determinant of the Hessian matrix  
2 2
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= − − >
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂
.     (4.5.6) 
   92
That is, the retailer profit function is jointly concave in ( 0 1,p p ) for . Setting 10 ≤≤ r
0 1( , ) 0R p pπ∇ =  results in the optimized retail prices, 




a t a bp c




,  (4.5.7) 
and                      * 11( 2, )
1 ( 2 ) [ 5 2 ]
(3 ) 2S NC
Bcp A C r
B r
C A⎧ ⎫= − + + −⎨ ⎬− ⎩ ⎭
, (4.5.8) 
where A, B, and C are defined in Section 4.4.1. It is clear that the store-brand retail price 
is independent of r and it is identical to the corresponding integrated system’s retail price. 
Note that 
* 2
1( 2, ) 0 1 1 1 1 0
2
( )( ) 0
(3 )





< .    (4.5.9) 
Accordingly, the outside retail price is the smallest when r=1, that is, 
*
1( 2, ) 1 1(6 2 )(4 )S NC r
1p C A Bc B −= = − + . In comparison to the integrated system’s, 
*
1( )Ip , 
                           
2
* * 0 1 1 1 1 0
1( 2, ) 1 1( )
( )( ) 0
2S NC r I
b b t a b c c tp p
B=
− − +
− = > . (4.5.10) 
This comparison indicates that the supply chain will not be coordinated with retailer’s 
non-coordinating decisions for [0,1]r∈ . 
Proposition 4.5.1: Under decision scenario S2, and retailer’s non-coordinating 
framework, the store-brand retail price remains identical to that of the integrated system, 
while the outside retail price is higher than the corresponding retail price of the 
integrated system for .  [0,1]r∈
 The above result resembles a similar property as in the case of S1, see Proposition 
4.4.1, that the retailer’s non-coordinating decisions increase her market share due to 
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product substitutability, while the total supply chain profit declines in comparison to the 
integrated system.  
 Letting , the non-coordinating optimal results in S2 are represented as 0 1T a t a b= + 0
       
2 2
* 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
( 2, )
1
[( ) ] [(2 2 ) 4 ] (3 3 )
2 (3 )S NC
a c t C bT r a tc C b t r b c C bTw
b C r
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where  is the wholesale price, *( 2, )S NCw
*
( 2, )M S NCπ  is the supplier profit, and  is 
the retailer profit shared from outside products. Note that  
*
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and for the retailer’s total profit , we have * ( 2, )R S NCπ
                                     
* 2











Therefore, an increasing revenue-sharing rate leads to higher profit for the supplier. 
Moreover, the retailer’s total profits as well as profit generated from outside products 
increase as revenue-sharing rate increases. As such, under the scenario S2, both the 
supplier and the retailer maximize their profits when r=1, which indeed is a wholesale-
price contract.  
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Proposition 4.5.2: Under decision scenario S2, when the retailer seeks to optimize her 
own profit, a wholesale-price contract assures both the supplier and the retailer the 
largest possible profits. 
 
4.5.2 The Case of Retailer Coordination Decisions (RCD) under S2 
In coordinating decisions, the retailer chooses retail prices on the basis of the entire 
supply chain, which leads to the same retail prices as those of the integrated system: 




a t a bp c








a t a bp c





Using forward substitution, 
* 1
( 2, ) 1
1 [ ] [ 2
2S C
]Bcw A Bc r C A
B
⎧ ⎫= + + − −⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
.    (4.5.18) 
As in the case of S1, see (4.4.21), the coordinating wholesale price increases in r, and 
given the same revenue-sharing rate, it can be shown that the difference between the 
coordinating wholesale prices under S2 and S1 is  > 0. 11 1 1 0 1( )(a b c tc b
−− + 2 )
2 )
Proposition 4.5.3: For any given revenue-sharing rate, the coordinating wholesale price 
under S2 is larger than that under S1, where the price difference is constant at 
. 11 1 1 0 1( )(a b c tc b
−− +
 The supplier profit is,           
                                       
2





r a b c tc
b
π − − += .                                     (5.19) 
It is clear that the supplier’s profit decreases in r, which is different from the non-
coordinating case, see (4.5.14). As a result, the supplier’s profit ranges from 
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2 1
1 1 1 0 1[ ] (4a b c tc b
−− + 2 11 1 1 0 1] (2 )a b c tc b)  to [
−− +  under retailer’s coordinating decisions 
under scenario S2. 
 For the retailer’s total profit , it can be shown that * ( 2, )R S Cπ
                                       
* 2




R S Cd a b c tc
dr b
π − +
= > ,  (4.5.20) 
i.e., the retailer’s total profit increases in the revenue-sharing rate. That is, the retailer 
achieves the highest profit when r=1, and the two-parameter revenue-sharing contract 
reduces to a wholesale-price contract in this case.  
 Furthermore, it can be shown that * 1( 2, ) 1 1 1 0 1 1( )(2 )S Cw a b c tc b
− c= + + >  for r=1. In 
contrast to the case of S1, where the coordinating wholesale-price contract leaves no 
profit for the supplier since the optimal wholesale price equals the production cost, the 
supplier can still make profit under S2.  
 The one-parameter revenue-sharing contract does not apply in scenario S2 in that 
the wholesale price is the supplier’s decision variable. Also note that in both scenarios 
and both coordinating and non-coordinating decisions, the store-brand retail prices are 
always set optimal as for the entire supply chain, which partially explains why the store-
brand products are always observed with low prices. 
Proposition 4.5.4: The store-brand retail prices are consistently set the same as that of 
the integrated system, regardless of the decision rights scenarios or the retailer’s 
preference for coordinating or non-coordinating decisions. 
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4.6 Performance Comparison and Decision Strategies 
The preceding sections analyzed retailer’s four possible decision frameworks, namely, 
the case of S1/RNCD, S1/RCD, S2/RNCD, and S2/RCD. Our focus next is on conditions 
under which the retailer chooses one of these frameworks for decision making. We first 
analyze the retailer’s decision making under scenario S2 in which the supplier specifies 
the wholesale price. 
 As shown in Section 4.5, the retailer’s total profits increase in the revenue-sharing 
rate in both RNCD and RCD frameworks, see (4.5.16) and (4.5.20). Furthermore, it can 
be shown that 
                            
2
* * 1 1 1 0
( 2, ) 0 ( 2, ) 1
1
( )| |
12R S NC r R S C r
a b c tc
b
π π= =
− + 0− = >
0=
. (4.6.1) 
That is, under scenario S2, the least possible profit for the retailer under non-coordinating 
decisions is larger than the largest possible profit under coordinating decisions. 
Combining with the result in Proposition 4.5.2 that a wholesale-price contract maximizes 
the profits for both the retailer and the supplier under retailer’s non-coordinating 
decisions, the following conclusion is reached: 
Proposition 4.6.1: When the supplier chooses the wholesale price, a non-coordinating 
wholesale-price contract is the optimal choice for the retailer. 
 Under S1, where the supplier chooses his retail price, the retailer’s total profit in 
both non-coordinating and coordinating decisions increase in r, see (4.4.13) and (4.4.25). 
Comparing the retailer’s non-coordinating profits under the two scenarios S1 and S2, it 
can be shown that, 
                                           * *( 1, ) 0 ( 2, ) 1| |R S NC r R S NC rπ π= − = . (4.6.2)  
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That is, under non-coordinating decisions, the retailer’s smallest total profit under S1 is 
equal to the largest possible total profit under S2. From the retailer’s perspective, the 
retailer’s non-coordinating two-parameter contract under S1 thus  outperforms any 
contracting decision under scenario S2. Also note that in S1, for a given revenue-sharing 
rate r, where 0 r 1≤ ≤ , it can be shown that . The following result thus 
holds: 
* *
( 1, ) ( 1, )R S NC R S Cπ π>
Proposition 4.6.2: When the revenue-sharing rate is fixed, the retailer will let the 
supplier determine his retail price and make decisions to optimize her own profit 
function. 
 
 Suppose there is an (outside) niche supplier and the supplier-retailer transactions 
occur only if the supplier is assured with a minimum profit level of H under a revenue-
sharing contract. Consider the case of S1. The retailer is then able to set both the 
wholesale price and the revenue-sharing rate to capture the rest of the supply chain profit. 
Furthermore, given that the supplier assumes H  in S1 and , where  is 
the revenue-sharing rate and 
*
( 1, ) 1( )M S NCH π= r 1r
1 [0,1]r ∈ , the retailer’s total profit using non-coordinating 
decisions is  since , 
noting that the coordinated supply chain attains the highest profit  independent of 
the revenue sharing rate. Therefore, the retailer can issue a revenue-sharing rate  such 
that . Due to , there exists a feasible 
range of  that corresponds to any 
* * *
( 1, ) 1 ( 1, ) 1 ( 1, )( ) ( )R S NC SC S NC SC S Cr r Hπ π π= − ≤ H−
*
* *
( 1, ) 1 ( 1, )( )SC S NC SC S Crπ π≤
*
( 1, )SC S Cπ
2r
* *
( 1, ) 2 ( 1, )( ) 'R S C SC S Cr Hπ π= −
*
( 1, ) 1 ( 1, )( )SC S NC SC S Crπ π≤
2r 1 [0,1)r ∈ for 'H H≥  and .  
* *
( 1, ) 2 ( 1, ) 1( ) ( )R S C R S NCr rπ π≥
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That is, given a minimum required profit H  for the supplier to be achieved under RNCD, 
the retailer can alternatively specify a coordinating revenue-sharing rate  to assure both 
agents more profit in contrast to the non-coordinating decisions.  
2r
Proposition 4.6.3: Under S1, for any profit level that the supplier achieves in retailer’s 
non-coordinating decisions, there exist a retailer coordinating decision that specifies an 
alternative pair of wholesale price and revenue-sharing rate that leads to Pareto 
improvement. 
 
The property of Proposition 4.6.3 can be illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 Profits under Scenario S1 
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Figure 4.1 is based on the equilibrium results of S1 and by setting 0 1 10a a= = , 
, , and . In the legend of the figure, “Mnc” represents the 
supplier’s profit under RNCD, “Mc” represents his profit under RCD, “Rnc” is the 
retailer’s non-coordinating profit, and “Rc” is the retailer’s coordinating profit. 
0 1 5b b= = 1t = 0 1 1c c= =
 In terms of the supplier’s non-coordinating profit achieved at , there exists a 
Pareto area noted by  where the retailer’s coordinating decisions allow 




 From the supplier’s standpoint, a retailer coordinating decision leads to higher 
profit than a non-coordinating decision at any revenue-sharing rate. To see this, define 
the constant 21 1 1 0 1( ) (D a b c tc b
14 )−= − + . Then, the outside supplier’s profits under the 
four decision frameworks can be shown in Table 4.1, where profits are indicated per unit 
of D. Also in the same table, the lower and upper bounds on these profits are shown as r 
varies from 0 to 1. Indeed, r need not take on the same value in different decision 
frameworks. 
 Observe that the supplier total profit range covered by the non-coordinating 
(RNCD) decisions is ]4/1,0[]4/1,9/2[]4/1,0[ =∪ , while that due to coordinating (RCD)  
Table 4.1: Supplier’s Profit under Four Decision Frameworks 
















 2 r−  
Supplier profit 
range/D 
[0,1/ 4]  [0,1]  [2 / 9,1/ 4]  [1, 2]  
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decisions is . Since , it follows that at any level of r, the 
supplier is better-off under coordinating decisions, so long as , where K the 
supplier’s profit per unit D. In particular, if 
]2,0[]2,1[]1,0[ =∪ ]2,0[]4/1,0[ ⊂
[0, 2]K ∈
[1/ 4,1]K ∈ , then retailer must use the (S1,C) 
framework, whereas if , the retailer must use the (S2,C) decision framework. 
Indeed, for 
[1, 2]K ∈
2K > , there is no feasible relationship between the retailer and the supplier. 
 A graphical illustration of the above analysis is in Figure 4.2 using the same 
parameters as in Figure 4.1. The legends Ms1nc, Ms1c, Ms2nc, and Ms2c represent the 
supplier profits per unit D in frameworks of S1/RNCD, S1/RCD, S2/RNCD, and 
S2/RCD, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.2: Supplier Profits 
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4.7 Discussions and Conclusions  
This chapter investigates the supply chain coordination problem when the retailer sells 
store-brand products in a single retailer-single supplier framework. We modeled the 
(outside) supplier-retailer interactions via revenue-sharing contracts and assumed the 
retailer always takes the role of Stackelberg leadership. Two scenarios of decision 
making are studied: first, the supplier chooses his own retail price only, and second, the 
supplier determines his own wholesale price only.  
 Our research shows that a two-parameter revenue-sharing contract with its ability 
to share profit flexibly outperforms a wholesale-price contract or a one-parameter 
revenue-sharing contract. When the supplier is “let” to choose his retail price and the 
retailer can justify both the wholesale price and the revenue-sharing rate, the retailer’s 
coordinating decisions generate Pareto improvement over non-coordinating decisions, 
although coordination undermines market share and profitability of the store-brand 
product. In contrast, when the supplier determines his wholesale price, a non-
coordinating wholesale-price contract is an optimal choice for the retailer. 
 This research offers certain practical implications. For instance, in the case of Wal-
Mart, a one-parameter revenue-sharing contract limits her share of revenue that is 
uniquely determined by both products’ cost and demand structures, whereas the two-
parameter revenue-sharing contracts have the flexibility in allocating profits. This 
research also illustrates the importance of store-brand strategy. For example, the 
existence of store brands not only provides a source of profit for retailers but also, it 
avoids suppliers’ pricing collusion due to the fact that any such high pricing allows the 
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store-brand products to capture more market share and thus more profit from store-brand 
product.  
 Our future research will focus on how information asymmetry impacts the decision 
in a supply chain with retailer selling store-brand and outside supplier products with a 
revenue-sharing contract. 
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